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NOTES
State Regulation of the Insurance Business and the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act
In the case of United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Associa-
tion et al.,1 the Supreme Court, on June 5, 1944, held that the Sherman
Act2 was applicable to the business of insurance transacted across state
lines. The effect of this decision was to reverse the seventy-five year old
"rule" of Paul v. Virginia 3 that the writing of a policy of insurance was
not a transaction of commerce. As a result, serious doubts were cast upon
the validity of state systems for the regulation of insurance founded upon
that "rule." Cognizant of this, Congress shortly thereafter enacted Public
Law 15 4 (the McCarran-Ferguson Act) which provided that it was in
the public interest for the states to regulate and tax the insurance business
and that until January 1, 1948 (later amended to June 30, 1948), the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act (except as it dealt with boycotts, coercion and
intimidation) and several other statutes 5 would not apply to the business
of insurance. The first test of the McCarran Act arose in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin 6 in which the court upheld a South Carolina
premium tax on business done within the state by a foreign insurance
corporation. The reason given by the court was that Congress, in enact-
ing the statute, had exercised its plenary power over interstate commerce
by allowing the states to regulate and tax the insurance business.
Prior to the South-Eastern decision many states had enacted legis-
lation permitting or ordering the formation of bureaus to gather informa-
tion and establish insurance rates. It is evident that Congress had these
systems in view when it passed the McCarran Act.7 As a result, it would
appear that Congress looked toward the establishment and continuation
of the above state systems of rate regulation which were, in themselves,
contrary to the anti-price-fixing interpretation of the Sherman Act,8 as
well as to the continued existence of systems in other states providing for
competition in the insurance business under state supervision.
Rate-making is a fundamental operation in the conduct of the insur-
ance business. In the fields of fire and casualty insurance, much of the
making of rates is done by bureaus, in which many of the insurance car-
riers are members or to whose services they subscribe. Since price-fixing
is one of the violations per se of the Sherman Act,9 some form of legis-
lation by the states was essential to preserve the existence of the fact-
analyzing and fact-gathering functions of the rate bureau.10 While op-
1. 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1940).
3. 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
4. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. § 1011-1015 (Supp. 1946).
5. The Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.
6. 328 U. S. 408 (1946).
7. 91 Cong. Rec. 1551-1552 (Feb. 27, 1945)-statement by Senator Ferguson, co-
author of the bill.
8. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et at., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. et at., supra note 8.
10. The legislation passed by the states relates to fire, casualty, surety and allied
lines of insurance. For the purposes of this note, no distinction need be made between
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ponents of monopolistic practices in business urge that rate bureaus are
monopolistic and should be prohibited,"- the proponents of such bureaus
argue that functioning bureaus actually help to keep rates down by amass-
ing and interpreting larger quantities of information relative to risk, e. g.,
past and prospective losses, than would be available to the individual
insurer.1
2
Before the end of the "moratorium" many states will have enacted
legislation concerning rate bureaus. That part of this legislation which
may be contrary to the philosophy of the Sherman Act should be exam-
ined with two considerations in mind. (1) It is said that the prime func-
tions of insurance are to shift the risk of and distribute individual losses
incident to any of life's activities. Thus the interest of the insured should
be closely safeguarded in the administration of any state regulatory systems
and, with due regard to the interest of the investors in insurance com-
panies, any benefits accruing through joint rate-setting and other joint
practices should accrue to the insured. (2) Since an effect of the per-
mitting of price-fixing is to discourage competition,13 the public requires
adequate protection from higher costs of management due to a possible
decline of efficiency following the removal of the efficiency-inducing effect
of competition.
Several problems arising from legislation, existing and proposed,
which permits rate-fixing will be considered here. (1) What kind of"regulation" do state insurance statutes permitting rate-bureaus and rate-
fixing provide? (2) Does this legislation preclude the application of the
federal statutes named in the McCarran Act (herein of the Sherman Act) ?
(3) When the "public interest" is not being served by state regulation,
although the nature of the state statutes preclude the federal statutes from
being applied, what kind of action could the federal authorities take?
I
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Within the past three years most state legislatures have enacted insur-
ance rate-regulation legislation. These statutes are, with slight local
variations, modeled along the lines of the "bill" drafted by the "All-
Industry" Committee of the insurance business.' 4 They were intended to
the bills as to the types of insurance covered; similar provisions in each bill are de-
terminative of the solution to the problem of how much "regulation" they provide. The
more recent bills include all of the above types of insurance within one statute.
11. Brief for United Sstates, pp. 108-119, United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n. et al., 322 U. S. 533 (1944).
12. HUEBNER, PROPERTY INSURANCE 347 (1938).
13. T. N. E. C. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (1941).
14. See, for examples, ALA. CODE, tit. 28, §§ 355-387, 388-411 (Supp. 1945) ; ARiz.
CODE, c. 61, §§ 61-1100-61-1128, 61-1200-61-1212 (Supp. 1945) ; Ark. Acts 1947, No. 50,
p. 100, No. 116, p. 265; CONN. GEN. STAT., c. 219, §§ 838h-845h, c. 221, §§ 858h-869h
(Supp. 1945); Del. Laws 1947, c. 161, p. 416; D. C. CODE, §§ 35-1401-35-1409 (Supp.
V 1946); Ga. Laws 1947, code §§ 56-218-56-221, No. 365, No. 366, p. 1523; HAWAII
REv. LAWS, c. 161, §§ 8517-8524 (1945); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 73, §§ 1036-1052
(Smith-Hurd, 1940); Ind. Acts 1947, c. 60, 111; Ky. REv. STAT., §§296.390-296.990
(1946) ; LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 33, c. 16, §§ 4222-4243 (1939) ; Md. Laws 1945, c. 926,
927; MIcH. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, §§ 24.49-24.59 (1943); N. J. S. A., tit. 17,
§§ 17:29A1-28 (Supp. 1946); N. Mex. Laws 1947, c. 128, 154; N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws,
Bk. 27, §§ 181-187 (McKinney, 1940); N. CAR. GEN. STAT., Art. 13, §§ 58-125-
58-131.9, Art. 13A, §§ 58-131.10-58-131.125 (Supp. 1945); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN.,
§§ 9592-1-9592-35 (Page, Supp. 1947); Penna. Laws 1947, Acts 246, 247 (Purdon's
provide that degree of regulation of the insurance business which would
avoid the Scylla of prosecution under the Sherman Act and the Charybdis
of oppressive state regulation. The line must be drawn, and an attempt
has been made so to do, between the mere licensing of prohibited ac-
tivities 15 and the prospect of complete governmental control of the busi-
ness.
The statutes generally provide that their purpose is neither to dis-
courage competition nor encourage uniformity in rates and practices and
that they are to be liberally construed to carry into effect such purposes.'6
It will be noted that the approach so taken is a negative approach, i. e.,
there is no statement that competition is to be encouraged nor is there any
statement that uniformity in rates will be discouraged.
The elements of state "regulation" of joint rate-making and rate-
setting processes fall into two broad categories: (1) those elements which
are concerned with the making and filing of rates which are to be estab-
lished, and (2) those elements which are concerned with the powers of
the state insurance supervisory official, hereafter called the "commis-
sioner." The safety of the public interest in minimized rates and in the
solvency and efficiency of the insurer lies in the commissioner's con-
scientious exercise of his duties in carrying out the purposes of the act.
The statutes provide for the establishment of two kinds of rate-making
organizations: (1) the rate bureau, which collects information, determines
rates and makes rate filings for different classifications of risk for its
members,' 7 and (2) the advisory organization, which merely collects and
collates the statistical data concerning risk but does not file rates.'8  The
statutes also provide that before a license may be issued to a rating bureau,
it must be "competent, trustworthy, and otherwise qualified" to perform
the functions of a rating bureau.' 9 While most of the statutes do not
provide any criteria for this test, a few provide that the bureau have a"sufficient" number of members, 20 that it be adequately staffed with per-
sonnel who are qualified in the making of rates,2 ' and that it have a good
business reputation.2 2 Membership is open to any insurer, subject to rea-
sonable rules imposed by the bureau.23  However, a number of states
require insurers to become members or subscribers of a rate bureau, one
which is either already in existence 24 or is to be formed by a group of
insurers themselves.2 5 Generally the government of the bureau is in the
Penna. Leg. Service); S. Dak. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 142, 143; TENN. CODE ANN.,
§§ 6356.1-6356.31 (Supp. 1946) ; Wash. Sess. Laws 1947, c. 79, Art. 19, §§ 19.01-19.43.
The Pennsylvania statutes are representative of the group above and for the purposes
of this note all footnote references to the Provisions of the statutes which are generally
adopted will be in terms of the applicable section of the Pennsylvania Casualty and
Surety Regulation statute. This is Act 246 of the 1947 legislative session.
15. See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 350 (1904).
16. Pa. Laws 1947, Act 246, § 1.
17. Id. §6.
18. Id. § 10.
19. Id. §6.
20. Md. Laws 1945, c. 927, § 1 (99A-3 (4) (a & b)).
21. Md. Laws, supra note 20; Aiuz. CODE, c. 61, §61-1105 (Supp. 1945).
22. ARIz. CODE, c. 61, § 61-1105 (Supp. 1945).
23. Pa. Laws 1947, Act 246, § 6.
24. LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 33, c. 16, §§ 4222-23 (Dart, 1939).
25. ARiz. CODE, c. 61, § 61-1119 (Supp. 1945) ; D. C. CODE, § 35-1404 (Supp. V
1946); HAwAii REv. LAWS, c. 161, § 8517 (1945); ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 73, § 1044
(Snith-Hurd, 1940).
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hands of the members themselves, whether membership be optional or
compulsory.2 6 Appeal for refusal to admit an insurer to membership lies to
the commissioner.
2 7
In any of these situations, an individual insurer may satisfy the re-
quirement that rates be filed by becoming a member of a bureau which
files rates.28 But when the rates are filed, the bureau members must
adhere to them (with exceptions noted infra) .29
Rate bureaus are permitted to cooperate with each other provided the
filed rates meet the requirements of the act, but the bureaus may not
regulate payment of dividends to policy-holders and members of the in-
surer.30  The criteria for setting rates are provided in the statutes. They
include past and present loss experience, both within and without the
state, reasonable margins for underwriting profits and contingencies, divi-
dends to policy-holders and past and prospective costs.31 There is usually
a caveat that the rates must be neither excessive, inadequate (to maintain
the solvency of the insurer) or unfairly discriminatory.3 2 Arkansas places
a percentage limit on profits so that where, over a specified period of time
(five years) the aggregate of "underwriting" profits made by all com-
panies engaged in the business of fire insurance within the state is greater
than five per cent, the commissioner has the power to reduce the rates so
that the underwriting profit will not exceed five per cent.
3 3
The powers of the commissioner include the power to license the
rating bureau. The statutes provide that the commissioner "shall" 34 or
"may" 35 issue a license to the bureau if he finds that it meets the statutory
requirements. If later, after a hearing, the commissioner finds that it no
longer meets these requirements, he may revoke the license.3 6
Proposed rate schedules, with the information on which they are
based, must be filed with the commissioner before they may become
effective.37 If the additional information has not been submitted, the com-
missioner may require that this be done. s Most of the statutes provide a
waiting-period of from 15 to 60 days before the rates become effective.3 9
This, obviously, is intended to afford the commissioner a period in which
to examine the rates and rate-bases and to see whether or not they meet
the statutory requirements. These are divided into those states which
require affirmative, i. e., "active," approval, 40 and those which provide
that if the rates are not disapproved within the waiting period they become
26. E. g., D. C. CODE, § 35-1404 (Supp. V 1946). But LA. GEN. STAT., tit. 33, c.
16, § 4224 (Dart, 1939) provides that the state fire marshal shall be a member of the
bureau.
27. Pa. Laws 1947, Act 246, § 6.
28. Id. §4.
29. Id. §7.
30. Id. §6.
31. Id. §3.
32. Ibid.
33. Ark. Acts 1947, No. 50, § 3(a) (4).
34. Pa. Lavs 1947, Act 246, § 6.
35. CoxN. GEN. STAT., c. 219, § 840h (Supp. 1945).
36. Pa. Lavs 1947, Act 246, § 6.
37. Id. §4.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Aaiz. CODE, c. 61, § 61-1110 (Supp. 1945); D. C. CODE, § 35-1408 (Supp. V
1946) ; ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 73, §§ 1037-9, 1042 (Smith-Hurd, 1940) ; LA. GEN. STAT.,
fit. 33, c. 16, § 4222 (Dart, 1939).
effective automatically thereafter.41 The commissioner need not review
all the filings-only those necessary to carry out the purposes of the act.
42
The commissioner's power of approval or disapproval is not arbitrary;
he may not disapprove a filed rate if it meets the requirements of the Act.
43
From the nature of the terminology used in establishing the criteria,
44 it
is apparent that he has some discretion in the matter. In order to dis-
approve, however, he must first hold a hearing with interested insurers
and rate bureaus, 45 and if he disapproves, appeal lies to the court system
of the state in accordance with local administrative agency laws and court
procedure.46  Unusual (i. e., involving odd types of risks) filings become
effective immediately; the extent of this category may be enlarged, as
needed, by the commissioner.47 The commissioner may, after hearings,
order a rate bureau to make additional filings on behalf of a bureau mem-
ber, if the bureau's refusal so to do (perhaps because of difficulties due
to the nature of the risk concerned) was unreasonable.
48
The commissioner has the power to order, after a hearing, the dis-
continuance of practices, by either a rating bureau 49 or an advisory or-
ganization,50 which are unfair or unreasonable in view of the purposes of
the Act.
With the approval of the commissioner, a bureau member may in-
crease or decrease its rates from the original filing by a uniform per-
centage, such rates to be effective for one year unless the commissioner
later rules otherwise.
5 1
The commissioner is required to examine the bureaus and advisory
organizations at least once every specified number of years (generally
five years) .52 However, in lieu of an examination, the commissioner may
accept the report of an examination of the bureau made by the insurance
supervisory official of another state.53 The commissioner's reports of
examinations are not to be made public before a hearing of the group or
bureau examined is held and he may thereafter withhold the report from
the public as long as he deems proper.54
In making rules and statistical plans, the commissioner is authorized
to promulgate them as adapted to each of the rating systems on file with
him.r5 Apparently this is not meant to infer that there will be a variety
of rating-systems at all times, but only until the systems can be made
uniform, for the commissioner is authorized to consult with officials of
other states to make the rating-systems uniform,56 and rating bureaus are
authorized to consult with rate-making bureaus in other states for rate-
making purposes.5 7 Whether this means "for purposes of evaluating the
relative importance of various factors of risk and loss" or "for setting
41. Pa. Laws 1947, Act 246, § 4.
42. Pa. Laws 1947, Act 246, § 4.
43. Id. § 5.
44. Id. § 3: Rates must not be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."
45. Id. §5.
46. Id. § 17.
47. Id. § 4.
48. Id. § 8.
49. Id. § 6.
50. Id. § 10.
51. Id. §7.
52. Id. § 12.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Id. § 13.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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uniform rates" is not made clear. It is unlikely that it is for the latter
purpose in view of the avowed purposes of the Act."s
A residual grant of all powers necessary to enforce and carry out the
provisions of the Act and its full intent is made to the commissioner. 9
The sanctions granted to him are the power to impose a fine for each
violation, varying in size according to whether the violation was wilful or
not, and the power to suspend the operating license of either a rate bureau
or an insurer.10 Appeal from his orders lies to the state courts, in accord-
ance with local appellate procedures. 61
II
AN ANALOGOUS SITUATION
Much of the problem of what action will be required to forestall 'he
application of the Sherman Act to the insurance business turns upon the
meaning of the term "regulation" as it is used in the McCarran Act.
62
The question was in part resolved in Parker v. Brown.63 A California
statute 64 authorized the establishment of programs for the marketing of
agricultural commodities through action of state officials in order to re-
strict competition in marketing for the purpose of maintaining the prices
of those commodities. The subsequent action by state officials consisted
of: (1) granting of permission to institute a program; (2) approval and/or
modification of the suggested program by state officials; (3) enforcement of
the program by sanctions provided by the legislature.
In an action by a producer to enjoin the enforcement of a program
instituted under the statute, the Supreme Court held that the program was
valid despite the provisions of the Sherman Act. The court stated that:
". . . the prorate program here was never intended to operate by force
of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority and its
efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not intended
to operate or become effective without that command . . ." 65 The court
further said that the Sherman Act was not intended to restrain state action
58. Id. § 1.
59. Id. § 13.
60. Id. § 16.
61. Id. §17.
62. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015 (Supp. 1946). § 1: " . . the
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation . . . by the several states of
the business of insurance is in the public interest . . ." § 2(b) : ". . . after Jan-
uary 1, 1948 . . . [the Sherman Act] shall be applicable to the business of insurance
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law."
63. 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
64. CALIF. GEN. LAWs, Act 143a, § 1 et seq. (Deering, 1944). A State proration
commission was appointed by the Governor and was headed by the Director of Agri-
culture of the state. When the Commission approved the establishment of a pro-
gram for the proration and marketing of a particular commodity, the Director of
Agriculture was empowered to appoint a committee of producers to formulate a
program for the particular production zone. Upon formulation of the program by the
committee, the Commission was authorized to approve it, after public hearings and
after finding that the "program is reasonably calculated to carry out the objectives
of the Act." Id. § 15. The Commission had the Power to modify the Program and
approve it as modified. If the program was approved by the Commission and consented
to by a specified percentage of the growers in the zone, the Director was required to
declare it instituted. The program was administered by the program committee sub-
ject to the approval of the Director of Agriculture. Violation of the proration pro-
gram subjected a producer or handler to a fine and imprisonment for each violation.
65. 317 U. S. 341, 350-351 (1943).
or official action directed by the state. The court pointed out that a state
cannot give immunity to violators of the Sherman Act by authorizing
them to violate it or by declaring the legality of their actions. In this case
the acts done were not private acts-the state created the machinery for
the establishment of the program and the state adopted the program through
the commission and enforced it with penal sanctions as a governmental
policy. The state set up the conditions upon which the program would
become applicable, and the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit acts
of a state government.
It would appear likely that by analogy to Parker v. Brown the test
of validity of legislation permitting rate-fixing by bureaus in the insurance
business should be dependent upon the degree of actual participation by
the state, through its officials or its legislative orders, in the activities of
the bureaus. Whether or not a particular statute will meet this test de-
pends upon (1) whether or not the rate -bureau exists by the authority
of the state and how effective a control over its procedure the state is
empowered to exercise, and perhaps upon how effective a control it does
exercise; (2) whether or not membership in the rate bureau is compulsory
or permissive; (3) whether rates become effective by affirmative action
of a state official or without action by a state official; (4) whether rates
which have been set by the bureau are binding on members; (5) whether
a state supervisory official may adjust unsatisfactory rates; and (6) whether
sanctions exist which the state may exercise to enforce the observation of
the provisions of the statute regulating the bureaus.
III
ADEQUACY OF THE STATUTES
How do existing state statutes regulating insurance rates and rating-
bureaus meet these standards? The statutes are generally in conformity
except for the clauses permitting automatic approval. A statute with such
a provision may merely constitute a "cover" for private combination and
would not achieve effective rate control despite the existence of the power
later to disapprove. Bureaus established under such provisions might not
be exempted from prosecution under the Sherman Act. But even in states
providing for affirmative approval prior to the effective date of the rates,
there may be some question as to whether the "public interest" is being
served by state regulation. If the regulation is lax, as for example, when
approval of rates is given with little or no examination of the rate structure,
due, perhaps, to the failure of the state commission to have sufficient funds
to carry out such examination 06 or, as was disclosed in Missouri,67 to the
corruption of state officials, there will be grave doubt that this is "regula-
tion." In such an eventuality the remedy may be one of two possibilities:
either action by Congress will be required, in all likelihood effected through
the enactment of a federal statute regulating the insurance business," or
prosecutions may be instituted by the Anti-Trust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice on the theory that the business is unregulated.
66. Ark. Acts 1947, No. 300, p. 661: maximum appropriation for the year ending
June 30, 1948, is $45,100. This provides for a total number of 11 personnel of whom one
is a fire insurance rater.
67. State v. American Ins. Co. et al., 200 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1947).
68. Berge, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws 8 (Dept. of Justice release, Octo-
ber 29, 1946).
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CONCLUSION
What then will be necessary to preserve state systems of regulation?
It is recommended that the states not now requiring it, amend their statutes
to require affirmative approval of rates, as they are presently computed, be-
fore the end of the "moratorium." Furthermore, the state legislatures
should grant an annual appropriation sufficient to enable the insurance
commissioner and his staff to make a thorough examination into all pro-
posed and existing rates. If these steps are not taken, the federal govern-
ment could intervene, but probably would not, provided the basis of com-
putation of rates was changed from "pure-premium-plus-expense" to a
"pure-premium" basis, with rates kept down by unrestricted competition
in the non-risk elements of cost.69 It is hardly likely that there would
be opposition to such a proposal from the Department of Justice, since
the value to both insured and insurer through cooperation in risk-determina-
tion is recognized as being far greater than the public interest in freedom
from combination, where the insurance-buying public reaps the benefit.70
The present system for determination of rates includes the elements of
expense. This method obviously leads to rates that are higher than they
would be on a competitive basis, since the interests of all insurers must
be considered-the least efficient as well as the most efficient.71  While
proponents of the present method of computation argue. that unrestricted
competition would be destructive of financial stability, they would not deny
that there is adequate state regulation through the requirements of reserves
and "adequate rates" to prevent the ills of "cut-throating" if free com-
petition did exist.
J.M. G.
Public Aid to Establishments of Religion
The use of governmental authority to aid religious institutions is a
basic issue in United States constitutional law. The doctrine that church
and state shall be separate is axiomatic. But within the clear extremes
represented by political clerics and robed politicians, the limits of govern-
mental power to serve through a public function the ends of religious
institutions are being redefined. Issues currently arising relate principally
to schools 1 and occasionally to institutions such as hospitals and orphan-
ages which serve the public.
69. Ely, Regulation of Fire Insurance Rates, 95 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 59 (1946).
70. Berge, Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws 9 (Dept. of Justice release, Octo-
ber 29, 1946).
71. Ely, supra note 69 at 70-75.
1. Proposed federal aid to equalize state expenditures for education is the center
of a campaign to secure public funds for parochial schools. 39 NATION'S SCHOOLS
20-25 (1947) ; N. Y. Times, March 6, 1947, p. 27, col. 1. Of more than 26,000,000
pupils in elementary and high schools, approximately 2,500,000 attended sectarion
schools in 1940-41. Of the latter number, approximately 2,400,000 attended 10,000
Catholic parochial schools. 2 BIENNIAL SURVEY OF EDuCATION, C. IX (U. S. Office
of Education, 1941). The right of a parent to send his children to non-public schools
which meet state requirements has been affirmed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). Textbooks and
school supplies are furnished sectarian school pupils in a number of states, notably
Louisiana and Mississippi. Borden v. La. State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123
So. 655 (1929) ; Chance v. Miss. State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board, 190
Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941). In only three of the states where transportation of
parochial school pupils at public expense is authorized-Kentucky, Maryland, and
THE PROBLEM
Two recent cases, one in the United States Supreme Court and one
in a state supreme court, give substance to the problem. In Everson v.
Board of Education of Ewing Township,
2 a state statute authorizing local
boards of education to contract for the transportation of children living
remote from any schoolhouse to and from schools not operated for profit,
and a local resolution thereunder providing for reimbursement of parents
for the cost of transporting their children to "public and Catholic" schools
were held not to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
majority, while treating the case as a borderline situation, considered the
religious issue subordinate to the welfare aspect of the legislation, com-
paring the transportation service to police and fire protection. The dis-
senters considered the religious issue under the establishment clause of
the First Amendment controlling, and contended that the state aid in-
directly afforded religious institutions by the legislation in question is
precisely the sort of public welfare measure which the First Amendment
was designed to proscribe.
In People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,3 the parent of a
public school pupil sought to prohibit the teaching of religion in the public
schools during regular school hours under an arrangement, which is a
variation of the increasingly numerous "released-time" plans,
4 whereby the
local inter-faith council provides teachers of religion in public school build-
ings one period each week for Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups. It
was held that this is a voluntary plan of religious education which does not
restrict the free exercise of religion, and that the negligible cost to the state
does not violate the provision of the state constitution prohibiting the use
of public funds for sectarian education.
With the Everson case and the impending appeal to the United States
Supreme Court in the McCollum case, the issue of the extent of govern-
mental aid which may be afforded religious institutions under existing
constitutional limitations is presented squarely to the highest tribunal in
its true guise-as a religious issue under the First Amendment. The prior
cases, arising under state constitutional provisions restricting the use of
public funds for sectarian purposes, have cast the issues in terms of prop-
erty, and the only federal issue raised has been the ordinary due process
question of taking property from some private persons for the benefit of
others. The property approach avoids the issue, for it cannot be seriously
contended that institutions like schools and hospitals whose services are
available to the public without profit are private. Treating the religious
New Jersey-have the statutes when challenged been approved by the courts under
existing constitutions. A specific amendment to N. Y. CONST. Art. IX, § 4 followed
an unfavorable ruling in Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. 2d 576
(1938). For Law Review comment, see especially Notes, 50 YALE L. J. 917 (1941)
and 60 HAav. L. REv. 793 (1947). See also 33 VA. L. REV. 349 (1947) ; 51 HAgv. L.
REv. 935 (1938) ; 37 Micia. L. REv. 335 (1938) ; 7 FORDHAm L. REV. 436 (1938). For
case collections, see Notes, 141 A. L. R. 1148 (1942) ; 67 A. L. R. 1196 (1930) ; 5 A.
L. R. 879 (1920).
2. 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947). Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter and Burton
dissented.
3. 396 Ill. 14, 71 N. E. 2d 161 (1947). Probable jurisdiction of United States
Supreme Court noted. 15 LAW WEEK 3450 (1947).
4. The "released time" plan originated in 1914 in Gary, Ind., as an inter-faith
project for permitting public school pupils to attend religious instructjon for short
periods near the end of the school day. Now more than 1800 communities in 47 states
have adopted such plans enrolling in excess of 1,500,000 children. PROCEEDINGS, CON-
FERENCE ON RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION AND THE PUBLIC ScHooL 7 (Nat'l. Community
Relations Advisory Council, 1946).
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issue as controlling invokes a new restraint upon governmental aid to
religious institutions, and indicates an inquiry into the scope and meaning
of the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . ." The free exercise clause has been litigated extensively,
and in recent years has been applied to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 But the obverse problem raised
by the establishment clause has been rarely presented, 6 and in the Everson
case was before the Supreme Court for the first time in reference to a
state.
7
What is an establishment of religion? What is a law respecting an
establishment of religion which the First Amendment will be invoked to
prohibit? What principal issues are raised and what considerations deter-
mine court decisions?
TREATMENT AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
The judge's first approach is historical.8 A search for the historical
meaning of "an establishment of religion" as intended by the framers of
the Federal Constitution leads through the fragmentary records of dis-
cussion at the federal level to the controversy over Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia. Covering the decade 1776-
1786, the struggle ended successfully for the Jefferson-Madison group in
the defeat of an assessment bill designed to furnish tax funds to support
teachers of "the Christian Religion" of "the society of Christians" to which
each taxpayer "shall direct the money to be paid." 9 The Memorial and
Remonstrance written by Madison in opposition to the assessment bill
refers repeatedly to "the establishment in question," -1 indicating that a
tax program designed to require the members of religious denominations
to contribute to the support of teachers in their own sects was regarded
as an establishment of religion. The Madison group drew a sharp line
between church and state, and in support of the principle, were unwilling
to countenance any inter-cohtrol. 11 There is a striking parallel between
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
6. Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 (1908) ; Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U. S. 291 (1899) ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890).
7. The Everson decision indicates no distinction between the effect of the estab-
lishment clause upon the states and the federal government. The public welfare prem-
ise is equally applicable to both. Proposed federal aid to the states to be used for
education in the same manner as state funds will tend to keep the issue single. N. Y.
Times, March 7, 1947, p. 27, col. 8.
8. See Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Twp., 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947);
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940) ; Reynolds v. United States,
98 U. S. 145 (1878); ROTTSCHAEFFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (1939). Summers,
The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. Rxv. 53, 55 (1946).
9. The text of the bill is printed in the supplementary appendix to the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504,
539 (1947). See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 162 (1878) ; ECKENRODE,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 102-103 (1910).
10. 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-191 (Hunt ed. 1901). See Everson v.
Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 535 (1947) (dissenting opinion app.).
11. ". . . it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We
hold this prudent jealousy to be the first duty of citizens. . . . The freemen of Amer-
ica did not wait 'til usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise, and entangled
the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the principle, and they
avoided the consequences by denying the principle ... " 2 MADISON, op. Cit. spra
note 10, 188.
the use of state authority to collect taxes from denominational members
for their own educational purposes, which the Madison group treated
specifically as an establishment of religion, and the use of tax funds today
directly or indirectly in support of religious institutions. Through Mad-
ison's authorship and the identity of the leadership, the content of the
term "establishment of religion" is logically transferred to the First
Amendment.'
2
The opposition in practice to the principles of the First Amendment,
however, was strong then as now, and more substantial abuses existed.
The established church of England, whose intolerance was within the
experience of colonists, grounds the contention that an establishment of
religion contemplates a church supported directly by the state to the ex-
clusion of other churches or sects.' 3 Further support for the argument
is found in the vestiges of religious intolerance which existed after the
adoption of the Federal Constitution and into the 19th century, illustrated
by religious tests for public office, compulsory attendance at public wor-
ship, and public grants to church schools.14 Under this view, only a direct,
substantial connection between a particular church and the state could
violate the First Amendment.
The success of the Madison group both in Virginia and in the federal
arena indicates that theirs is the true constitutional definition of an estab-
lishment of religion. It is even more significant, in view of the opposing
argument, that as the greater evils of church control of civil life have
subsided, there has been substantial agreement in the Supreme Court that
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment refer
to the complementary halves of the same problem.' 5 As the free exercise
clause prohibits restriction of religious freedom consistent with public
order, so the establishment clause prohibits the use of governmental au-
thority in affirmative aid of institutional religion.' 6 Indeed Mr. Justice
12. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were few and brief.
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (rev. ed. 1937) passim. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 729-731, 766 (1789) ; 9 MADISON, Op. cit. supra note 10, 484-488;
2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATioNS 960-969 (8th ed. 1927); JOHNSON, LEGAL
'STATUS OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES 90-95 (1934);
COBB, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AmERiCA 491 et seq. (1902).
13. Brief for National Council of Catholic Men as Ainicus Curiae, p. 25, Everson
v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947) ; BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AmERICAN CON-
sTrrUTIONAL LAw 518 (4th ed. 1927).
14. See GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 302-435
(1937) ; Zollmann, Historical Background of Religious Day Schools, 9 MARQUETTE L.
REv. 155 (1925). The states passed constitutional amendments restricting the use of
public funds for sectarian purposes principally in the 1870's. The proposed Blaine
amendment to the Federal Constitution in 1876, which would have applied the First
Amendment and a specific restriction on the use of state funds for sectarian purposes
to the states, is occasionally treated as proof of the restricted meaning of the establish-
ment clause. But it would seem that the question whether the First Amendment ap-
plies to the states is separate from that of the content of the establishment clause.
15. In Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947), compare majority
opinion of Mr. Justice Black, at 511, with dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge,
at 519. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 162 (1878). In Davis v. Beason,
133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890), the court said: "The First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, in declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, was intended . . . to prohibit legis-
lation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect."
Cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49 (1815).
16. The religious aspects of a suit between private parties do not preclude a court
from deciding the case. Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Nor is a
religious corporation precluded from holding property under protection of law.
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). In a more doubtful case, a
religious institution which was the incidental beneficiary of a contract between the state
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Black, speaking for the majority in the Everson case, states: "There is
every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the
'establishment of religion' clause [as to the free exercise clause] . " 17
Within the dictum, however, the impact of the establishment clause
may be avoided by (a) treating the institution as non-religious, or (b)
treating the law as not respecting the religious institution because the
beneficial effect is only incidental to the main purpose of the legislation, or
(c) not raising the issue. Thus (a) a hospital corporation has been
treated as an entity apart from the religious character of its controlling
management; 18 (b) the provision of transportation has been treated as
an incidental benefit; l and (c) textbooks have been furnished parochial
school pupils without raising the establishment issue.20  In one case the
Supreme Court held the First Amendment and a federal statute pro-
hibiting appropriation for sectarian schools inapplicable to treaty funds
appropriated by Congress to an Indian tribe and administered by the
Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the Indian nation's use of its
own funds was unrestricted. 21  Courts following the Everson decision are
not likely to ignore or evade the issue.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Determination of the scope to be given the establishment clause in its
application to the states requires an examination of state treatment of
similar problems. The state constitutions reflect more literally than the
First Amendment the desire to break the strongest link between the state
and institutional religion. The expenditure of public funds, at least school
funds, for sectarian purposes is specifically prohibited by all but one state
constitution.22 For ready reference in decreasing order of scope, the vary-
ing terms of state constitutional provisions may be classified as (1) those
prohibiting the use of public funds for any sectarian purpose or institu-
tion,2 3 (2) those prohibiting the use of public funds for sectarian 4 or
and a private party has been considered outside the state constitutional restriction. St.
Patrick's Church Society v. Heermans, 68 Misc. 487, 124 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1910)
(Franchise to lay water pipes granted on condition free water be supplied to all school-
houses held to include parochial school). Tax exemption, generally regarded as a
negative form of aid and ordinarily accorded religious institutions, is outside the scope
of this note.
17. 67 Sup. Ct. at 511, Mr. Justice Rutledge develops at length the complementary
meaning of the two clauses. Id. at 519-520.
18. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
19. Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947).
20. Cochran v. La. State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
21. Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 (1908). This case has been treated
as establishing a sharp distinction between public funds and funds held in trust by the
United States. See Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 525, note 35
(1947) (dissenting opinion).
22. Vermont has a provision in the usual form regarding the free exercise of re-
ligion, VT. CoNsT. c. I, Art. 3, but no specific restriction on the use of public funds.
23. Constitutions of: ARiz. Art. II, § 12; CA.IF. Art. IV, § 30; CoL. Art. V, § 34,
Art. IX, § 7; FLA. Declaration of Rights, § 6; GA. Art. I, § 1, par. XIV; IDAHo, Art.
IX, § 5; IL.. Art. VIII, § 3; IND. Art. I, § 6; LA. Art. IV, § 8; MIcH. Art. II, § 3;
MINN. Art. I, § 16; Mo. Art. II, § 7; MONT. Art. V, § 35; NEv. Art. XI, § 10; N. H.
Art. 82; OHILA. Art. II, § 5; ORE. Art. I, § 5; PA. Art. III, § 18; S. CAR. Art. XI,
§9; S. DAN. Art. VI, §3; TEX. Art. I, §7; UTAH Art. I, §4; WAsH. Art. I, §11;
Wis. Art. I, § 18; Wyo. Art. I, § 19.
24. Constitutions of: ALA. Art. XIV, § 263; ARiz. Art. IX, § 10; CALIF. Art. IX,
§ 8; DEL. Art. X, § 3; FLA. Art. XII, § 13; Ky. §189; LA. Art. XII, § 13; MINN.
Art. VIII, § 3; Miss. Art. VIII, § 208; NED. Art. VIII, § 11; N. MEX. Art. XII, § 3;
N. Y. Art. IX, § 4; N. DAK. Art. VIII, § 152; PA. Art. X, § 2; S. DAx. Art. VIII,
§ 16; TEX. Art. VII, § 5; WAsH. Art. IX, § 4.
non-state controlled schools, 25 and (3) those prohibiting the use of public
school funds for sectarian 26 or other than public school purposes.
27  The
term "school" may be defined to include only elementary and high schools,
28
although a number of state constitutions include all educational institu-
tions.29  Only the first type of provision governs other than educational
institutions. The lesser refinements of constitutional language do not in-
dicate distinctions and have not affected court decisions.
THE ExPRESSED ISSUES
Cases arising in the state courts, including those reaching the United
States Supreme Court, have turned on one or more of the following ex-
pressed issues: (1) whether the institution or purpose is sectarian; 30
(2) whether, under a constitution restricting the use of public school
funds, the fund in question is a school fund; 31 (3) whether the state's
action constitutes aid; 32 (4) whether the payment of funds by the state
in return for services rendered by the sectarian institution is aid; 33 (5)
25. Constitutions of: ALA. Art. IV, § 73; ARK. Art. XIV, § 3; CALIF. Art. IX,
§8; IDAHO Art. IX, § 5; KAN. Art. VI, § 8; ME. Art. VIII, MASS. AMEND. XLVI;
Mo. Art. XI, § 11; MONT. Art. XI, § 8; NEB. Art. VIII, § 11; N. MEX. Art. XII, § 3;
UTAH Art. X, § 13; VA. Art. IX, § 141; Wyo. Art. VII, § 8.
26. ALA. CONST. Art. XIV, § 263; OHIO CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2.
27. Constitutions of: ARK. Art. XIV, § 3; CONN. Art. VIII, § 2; DEL. Art. X,
§4; IDAHO Art. IX, § 3; IND. Art. VIII, § 3; IowA Art. IX, par. 2, § 3; KAN. Art.
VI, §3; NEB. Art. VIII, §9; N. J. Art. VI, §6, par. 6; N. CAR. Art. XI, §4; OKLA.
Art. XI, §3; R. I. Art. XII, §4; TENN. Art. XI, §12; W. VA. Art. XII, §4.
28. Opinion of Justices, 214 Mass. 599, 102 N. E. 464 (1913).
29. See, e. g., MAss. CONST. AMEND. XLVI and note 25 mtpra. For other classi-
fications, see Note, 50 YALE L. J. 917 (1941) ; GABEL, op. cit. supra note 14, 537-558;
PIZOR, USE OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FUNDS AND PROPERTY FOR OTHER THAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL PURPOSES (unpublished thesis in Temple University Library, 1938).
30. Institution or purpose found sectarian: Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa
691, 166 N. W. 202 (1918) ; Williams v. Stanton School Dist., 173 Ky. 708, 191 S. W.
507 (1917) ; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 (1869) ; Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758
(1879) ; Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S. W. 2d 609 (1942) ; Nevada Orphan
Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882) ; Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195
N. Y. Supp. 715 (1922) ; Findley v. Conneaut, 145 Ohio St. 480, 62 N. E. 2d 318
(1945) ; Constitutional Defense League v. Waters, 308 Pa. 150, 162 A. 216 (1932) ;
Collins v. Martin, 302 Pa. 144, 153 A. 130 (1931) ; Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428,
117 A. 440 (1921); Synod of Dakota v. State, 2 S. D. 366 (1891). Cf. McDonald
v. Parker, 130 Ky. 501, 110 S. W. 810 (1908); Com. ex rel. Wehrle v. Plummer, 21
Pa. Dist. Rep. 182 (1911). Institution or purpose found not sectarian: State ex rel.
Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N. E. 2d 256 (1940) ; Wright v. School Dist., 151
Kan. 485, 99 P. 2d 737 (1940). Cf. Millard v. Board of Education, 121 Ill. 297, 10
N. E. 669 (1887) ; Dorner v. School Dist., 137 Wis. 147, 118 N. W. 353 (1908).
31. State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1934) ; Nichols v.
Henry, 191 S. W. 2d 930 (Ky. 1945) ; Sherrard v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S. W. 2d 963 (1942); Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook
Rating and Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941) ; Everson v. Board
of Education, 133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. 2d 333 (1945).
32. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N. E. 2d 161
(1947); People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N. E. 2d 305
(1946); People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 N. E. 663 (1927) ; Stein
v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N. Y. Supp. 822 (1925).
33. Compare Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 Ili. 613, 117 N. E.
735 (1917) with Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ili. 540, 18 N. E.
183 (1888) ; St. Hedwig's School v. Cook County, 289 Ill. 432, 124 N. E. 629 (1919) ;
Trost v. Ketteler Training School, 282 Ill. 504, 118 N. E. 743 (1918) ; Nevada Orphan
Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882) ; Murrow Indian Orphans' Home v. Childers,
171 P. 2d 600 (Okla. 1946).
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whether the aid is directed to all religious sects or is discriminatory; 
34
(6) whether the aid is to the school or the pupil; 35 and (7) whether the
aid is a public service benefiting religious institutions only incidentally.
36
Attempts to bring payments for services beneficial to sectarian schools,
especially transportation of pupils, within the terms of the school code,
frequently have been defeated under the statute without resort to the con-
stitution.
3 7
(1) A sectarian institution has been defined as one affiliated with or
under the control, domination or governing influence of a body of persons
in some way united for purposes of worship and distinguished by a name
of their own.38 Under this definition, schools, universities, hospitals and
orphanages purporting to make no discrimination in rendering their services
have been held ineligible for state contributions because of the controlling
sectarian influence in their management.39 The same test has been gen-
erally applied to schools under constitutional provisions relating only to
schools. 40  But under similar constitutional provisions, the formal super-
vision by state public education authorities and the elimination of religious
worship during the prescribed school day have been held to render non-
sectarian a parochial school conducted in a church building under the
same faculty in religious garb.4 ' The ultimate refinement of definition
was reached in an old New York case 4 2 in which payments by the local
board of education to a sectarian orphanage for the secular education of
the inmates were held not to violate an explicit constitutional provision
because the orphanage was not a school. The application of the establish-
ment clause to such thinly disguised arrangements for state aid to sectarian
institutions dictates a contrary result.
34. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N. E. 2d 161
(1947); People ex rel. Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N. E. 2d 305
(1946); Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N. E. 735
(1917).
35. Cochran v. La. State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930) ; Borden v.
La. State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929) ; Adams v. Comm'rs.
of St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 26 A. 2d 377 (1942); Board of Education v.
Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938) ; Chance v. Miss. State Textbook Rating and
Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453; 200 So. 706 (1941) ; Judd v. Board of Education,
278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. 2d 576 (1938) ; Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div. 656, 195
N. Y. Supp. 715 (1922) ; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P. 2d 1002 (1941).
The most reasonable application of this distinction is made to temporary emergency
programs such as aid to veterans. See State ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251,
176 N. W. 224 (1919) ; SERVICEMEN'S READJUSTMENT AcT OF 1944, 58 STAT. 287, 38
U. S. C. § 701 (Supp. 1946).
36. Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947) ; Board of Education
v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1938). .
37. Connell v. Board of School Directors of Kennett Square, 356 Pa. 585 (1947);
Costigan v. Hall, 249 Wis. 94, 23 N. W. 2d 495 (1946) ; State ex rel. Van Straten
v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N. W. 392 (1923).
38. Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 A. 440 (1921).
39. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882); Constitutional De-
fense League v. Waters, 308 Pa. 150, 162 A. 216 (1932) ; Collins v. Martin, 302 Pa.
144, 153 A. 130 (1931) ; Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 A. 440 (1921).
40. State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1934) ; Williams v.
Stanton School Dist., 173 Ky. 708, 191 S. W. 507 (1917) ; Findley v. Conneaut, 145
Ohio St. 480, 62 N. E. 2d 319 (1945).
41. State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N. E. 2d 256 (1940). The
action was to recover on the school board treasurer's bond. The depression emergency
which gave rise to the arrangement appears to have influenced the court. Compare
the evidence in Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S. W. 2d 609 (1941) and Knowl-
ton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N. W. 202 (1908), where a contrary result was
reached.
42. Sargent v. Board of Education, 177 N. Y. 317, 69 N. E. 722 (1904).
(2) Whether only public school funds are within the state constitu-
tional restriction which affords no restraint, therefore, upon the general
fund is infrequently a decisive issue. A federal question under the estab-
lishment clause would make no distinction among state funds; if the state
aid establishes religion, the source of the money is immaterial. But in a
state which regards auxiliary services like transportation as aid to the
sectarian institution, contrary to the result in the Everson case, the restric-
tion on the school fund may be averted by an appropriation from the
general fund.43 The constitutions which restrict the use of funds appro-
priated for educational purposes are broad enough to include all appropria-
tions, whether or not earmarked to a particular fund.
44  And it may be
strongly argued that any appropriation for school purposes comes from
the school fund.45 The result is that within the area open to the states
under the Everson case, the state courts may construe their constitutions
more strictly, and prohibit indirect forms of aid like transportation.
(3) The inadequacy of state restrictions on the use of public funds
to meet the religious issue is illustrated by the cases concerning plans for
teaching religious subjects by releasing children to attend instruction out-
side the school or bringing teachers of religion into the school for scheduled
classes. The difficulty of determining the small cost to the public treasury
in handling cards, making reports, and using schoolrooms has led the
courts to dismiss the argument and find that the state activity does not
constitute aid.
4 6
(4) Payments of state funds to admittedly sectarian institutions have
been approved even in very recent cases on the ground that "aid" means
a gratuity, and that if an orphanage, for example, furnishes physical services
to the child valued at more than the state contribution, the state is not
aiding the institution.47  If this argument is valid, the constitutional pro-
visions are directed not at the danger of inter-control of church and state
institutions, but only at the danger of the public purse being overcharged.
To treat this issue as controlling is to remove the religious factor and
render the constitutional provisions meaningless in this respect. Logically
church institutions could provide all educational, medical and charitable
services within this view, as long as they did so at cost. Indeed the relief
which church organizations provide for the public pocketbook is a con-
43. In Nichols v. Henry, 191 S. W. 2d 930 (Ky. 1945), an appropriation from the
general fund was held constitutional, expressly distinguishing Sherrard v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, 294 Ky. 469, 171 S. W. 2d 963 (1942), in which appropri-
ation from the school fund was held unconstitutional. Everson v. Board of Education,
133 N. J. L. 350, 44 A. 2d 333 (1945), was decided on the same ground. Contra: State
ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1934).
44. See notes 29 and 25 supra.
45. State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 A. 835 (1934). See Chance
v. Miss. State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 476, 200 So. 706
(1941) (dissenting opinion) ; e. g., IowA CoNsT. Art. IX, par. 2, § 3; NFB. CoNqsT.
Art. VIII, § 4; defining the school fund to include "such other means as the legislature
may provide." The subordinate position of the school fund restrictions is illustrated
by those state constitutions containing both prohibition of aid to any sectarian insti-
tution and the school fund restriction. E. g., Mo. CoNsT. Art. II, § 7, Art. XI, § 11;
PA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 18, Art. X, § 3; Wyo. CoNsT. Art. I, § 19, Art. VII, § 8.
46. See cases cited note 32 supra.
47. Murrow Indian Orphans' Home v. Childers, 171 P. 2d 600 (Okla. 1946). The
court distinguished Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P. 2d 1002 (1941), in
which transportation of parochial school pupils at public expense was held unconstitu-
tional, on the ground that transportation is a gratuity. Contra: Nevada Orphan
Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882). See note 33 supra.
NOTES19471
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96
sideration implicit in decisions favoring indirect support, particularly in
those areas where parochial school systems are large.48
(5) A related interpretation reads into the constitutions only a pro-
hibition against discrimination among religious bodies.49 A statute pur-
porting to aid religious groups generally is in this view constitutional on
the reasoning that the state is not anti-religious but only neutral, and that
the absence of denominational issues meets the constitutional requirement.
By transference from the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and
the equal protection of laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this
argument has strong appeal. But the strength of a constitutional restric-
tion is easily diluted by verbal generality. This particular argument was
involved in the controversy over the Virginia Bill for Establishing Re-
ligious Freedom and presents an unambiguous historical record. 50 The
first resort of the proponents of an established church was to generalize
the bill for state aid to include a number of religious sects. This move
won over some church groups who had opposed not the principle of pre-
venting allocation of state funds to religious bodies but their own exclusion
from the benefit. Madison pointed out the danger of a scramble for state
support by a number of religious groups and was successful in excluding
all.51 The result is convincing that the First Amendment is directed not
only at discriminatory government action but at the use of state authority
in the affairs of religious institutions of all sects.
(6 & 7) The argument that state aid to all children of school age
renders a public service not to be enjoined unless a substantial breach of
the constitutional restriction is demonstrated furnishes the most convincing
ground for decisions upholding state payment for auxiliary services. That
the aid is to the pupil and therefore not to the school is a clumsy, fictional
means of circumventing the constitutional language.52 The aid is to both.
But conceding the indirect aid to the school, the Supreme Court seeks to
evaluate the social utility of the auxiliary service in terms of the danger
of a substantial breach of the constitutional safeguard.53 The public wel-
fare 'approach, however, skirts the religious issue. Although transporta-
tion inherently raises no problem except the financial one, the provision
of textbooks as a welfare measure opens issues relating to the content of
textbooks and ultimately to the fundamental cleavage between the public
48. In St. Mary's County, Maryland, 17 children attended parochial school for
every 22 attending public school in 1942. Parochial school buses carried 1300 chil-
dren, public school buses, 1400. Adams v. Comm'rs. of St. Mary's County, 180 Md.
550, 26 A. 2d 377 (1942).
49. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 396 Ill. 14, 71 N. E. 2d 161
(1947). But cf. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882). See note 34
.supra.
50. See Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 521 (1947) (dissenting
opinion) ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 162 (1878) ; ECENIRODE, SEPARA-
TION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA 102-103 (1910).
51. Ibid. That the same problem was presented in relation to school funds when
the public school systems were being established, see PROCEEDINGS, NEW JERsEY CoN-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION 400 et seq. (1844).
52. See especially dissenting opinions in Borden v. La. State Board of Education,
168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929) and Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199
A. 628 (1938). See also Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N. Y. 200, 15 N. E. 2d 576
(1938).
53. ". . . we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief." Everson v. Board of Education, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 512 (1947).
and parochial views of education. 54 No objection in principle can be
raised after acceptance of the welfare premise to the provision of free
lunches on a non-discriminatory basis, but the purchase of lunch room
equipment for parochial school buildings indicates the difficulty of drawing
a limit to reasonable welfare measures. 55 And capital improvements may
be sought along with temporary programs, like veterans' educational aid.56
In economic questions, the legislature has considerable latitude to meet
problems which are capable of factual analysis and evaluation. Issues of
faith cannot be so tredted. 57 The question of degree in cases involving the
basic freedoms has been determined by giving the broadest effect to the
principle. 58 Under the Everson case, however, the limits of the welfare
approach are likely to be fixed, not by the presence of the religious issue
in principle, but by the directness of the relationship, the extent of the aid,
and the forecast of additional direct relations.59
The welfare argument is inapplicable to the cooperative plans for
teaching religious subjects by releasing children to attend instruction out-
side the school or bringing the teachers of religion to the school building.60
The use of public funds is so small and indeterminate that the courts do
not seriously consider it.61 Although the voluntary character of the plans,
at least in theory, meets objections raised under the free exercise clause,
it is no answer to the establishment clause that the 'benefit to all religious
54. Textbooks furnished by the state may not be acceptable to the parochial school
system. ". . . the use of non-sectarian textbooks selected by the public school au-
thorities is likely to detract from the specifically Catholic nature of the instruction pro-
vided." (Emphasis supplied.) Donohue, Can Public and Parochial Schools Co-operate?,
35 NATION'S SCHOOLS 49 (1945). Possible outcomes of such a conflict are that pa-
rochial schools, (1) reject the books, or (2) influence their content, or (3) request
money in lieu of books. The short step from indirect to direct support is illustrated in
Maryland, where approval of a statute providing transportation for parochial school
pupils along the public school bus route, Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314,
199 A. 628 (1938), was followed by appropriations directly to the parochial schools to
help defray the cost of transportation in parochial school buses. Adams v. Comm'rs.
of St. Mary's County, 180 Md. 550, 26 A. 2d 377 (1942).
55. The Free School Lunch Act, 60 STAT. 230-233, 42 U. S. C. A. 1751-1760 (1946)
authorizes the disbursement of federal funds through the states or other agencies or
through the Secretary of Agriculture to non-profit private schools, as well as public
schools, for lunch room supplies. If the state on welfare grounds may provide lunch
room supplies, why not other essential physical needs? The pursuit of compulsory
education in a manner permitted by the Constitution would logically authorize the
state to provide at least physical facilities on welfare grounds. The answer to the im-
plication of inhumanity in the welfare argument is that the state provides all facilities
in the public schools, and leaves dissenters free to establish their own educational
systems.
56. See Bull v. Stichman, Comm'r. of Housing, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (1947), N. Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1947, p. 19, col. 4; note 35 supra.
57. Six physicians who were members of a committee seeking repeal of a Connec-
ticute statute making it a misdemeanor to disseminate birth control information were
dismissed from the staffs of Catholic hospitals which received state support. Time,
April 21, 1947, p. 58, col. 3.
58. See Craig et al. v. Harney, 67 Sup. Ct. 1249 (1947); West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvahia, 319
U. S. 105 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
59. The welfare aspect of public education is not likely to justify direct payments
to sectarian schools. But the ease wvith which incidental services become matters of
direct appropriation is already apparent. See note 54 supra and note 60 infra.
60. See note 4 supra. Over 40 per cent. of such plans are now conducted in pub-
lic school buildings. Children are necessarily segregated in the class room by denom-
inational groups. The theoretical voluntariness of the plans presents practical objec-
tions in that the enthusiasm of the proponents is likely to result in numerous pressures
upon dissenters. See PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE ON RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION AND THE
PUBLIC SCHOOL (Nat. Community Relations Advisory Council, 1946) passin.
61. See note 32 supra.
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groups is not discriminatory. In the McCollumcase, the Supreme Court
will face the issue of the use of non-financial state authority to aid in
teaching the tenets of the three major religious groupings. The court may
give greater effect to the principle of separation of church and state when
a clear religious issue, rather than a service in the nature of a public
utility, is involved.
CONCLUSION
The strictest limitation upon governmental aid to religious institu-
tions is required by the language, the historical content and the present
validity of American constitutional provisions. The principle is clear and
undisputed that formal interrelation of church and state institutions is pro-
hibited by the letter and spirit of these provisions. Once established, the
principle should be preserved intact against indirect as well as direct
abridgment. To support the doctrine of separation is not to advocate
irreligioni but to maintain institutionally a separation of functions the fusion
of which has invariably destroyed the usefulness of both institutions accord-
ing to democratic standards.
The state courts, in construing their constitutions, have with increasing
frequency in recent years failed to perceive the implications of ostensibly
minor infractions of the principle, and have permitted their legislatures to
aid religious institutions directly or indirectly. Sectarian schools in par-
ticular have sought and occasionally gained access to the public treasury,
by legislation if possible, and by constitutional amendment if necessary.
The enforcement of state constitutional provisions should be unyielding in
preventing the slightest inter-control of state and church, especially in the
field of education where the future of democratic attitudes is so largely
determined. The state cannot afford to compromise fundamental freedoms
in the least degree for even the most substantial budgetary saving.
The teaching of religious faiths as such under the authority of the
public school system is equally repugnant to the principle of separation
of church and state. Only the insignificance of the financial issue dis-
tinguishes the use of state power for this purpose from the provision of
services like transportation. Indeed the principle is more deeply involved
when the tenets of particular religious groups are taught to groups of
children segregated in different classrooms in the same building.
In the Federal Constitution, the language of the First Amendment,
prohibiting laws respecting establishments of religion, is technically broader
than comparable state constitutional provisions. Through the Fourteenth
Amendment the establishment clause provides a more uniform safeguard
against the use of governmental authority, federal or state, in affirmative
aid of religious institutions. The historical lesson is painfully clear that
exclusive aid to one religious group means oppression toward others, that
aid to some or all means at least a struggle for priority in government
favor which may eventually result in the supremacy of one. Indeed the
free exercise of religion, guaranteed by the second clause of the First
Amendment, is in danger of eclipse unless government refrains from inter-
fering either to aid or hinder religious groups. Thus the denial of ap-.
parent advantage, financial or otherwise, to any or all religious groups is
for the protection of the free existence of those groups and their ideas
within a democratic framework.
The Everson case indicates that a court appraising auxiliary services
like transportation to sectarian schools in terms of a present danger of sub-
stantial inter-control of church and state may circumvent the restriction.
Logically, however, if such services are public functions justifying state
support, then the public welfare feature of sectarian education itself pro-
vides an even stronger claim to state support; but there is no judicial dis-
sent from the view that such direct support is proscribed by both federal
and state constitutions.
The use of governmental authority, financial or persuasive, to aid or
hinder religious institutions directly or indirectly should be prohibited
under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. That prudent
jealousy of the basic freedoms which Madison considered essential to pre-
vent usurped power from strengthening itself by exercise, should be pru-
dently applied to see in the principle of separation itself the consequences
of a breach, and to avoid the possible consequences by preserving the prin-
ciple intact.
H.L.
Foreign Depositions Practice in American Civil Suits-
A Judicial Stepchild
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
How can the courts breach the confines of political boundaries in their
quest for evidence? This problem is inherent in the development of inter-
course between nations ' and, consequently, of prime importance in this
age of "one world." 2
The solution employed by American courts still bears the birthmarks
of depositions practice as originated by the Chancery courts and extended
by them to the procurement of testimony from witnesses in foreign coun-
tries.3 Because a jealous regard for the established rules of Evidence
impelled the English common law courts to disclaim a similar inherent
power,4 statutes in all American jurisdictions grant the courts this right
with detailed stipulations regarding its exercise. But inevitably the multi-
plicity of jurisdictions has produced a vexing disparity in these stipula-
tions with resulting confusion and uncertainty in our depositions pro-
cedure.5
Although American depositions statutes variously abridge the pro-
cedure, they consistently preserve the substance, of the law of Evidence;
1. As long ago as the first or second century B. C., a dispute involving several
Greek states necessitated the development of means of securing evidence in those states
for use in a third arbitrator state. I DAREsTE, REcUIEL DES INscIPTIONS JURIDIQUES
GRcQuxs 158 (1891).
2. For a practical criticism of the present American foreign depositions system,
see Heilpern, Procuring Evidence Abroad, 14 TULANE L. REv. 29 (1939). The House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its sixty-first convention in 1938
passed a resolution urging State Department action on the matter of expediting for-
eign depositions. See 24 A. B. A. J. 769 (1938).
3. The Chancery courts were reluctant to order a deposition except in cases Where
no present action at law could be brought and the petitioner was thereby in danger
of losing important Witnesses. However, they did order depositions to examine wit-
nesses abroad for use in a law suit. Westinghouse Machine Co. v. Electric Storage
Battery Co., 170 Fed. 430 (C. C. A. 3d 1909); Angell v. Angell, 1 S. & S. 83 (Ch.
1822). For a detailed discussion of depositions practice in the Chancery courts, see
WEEKS, LAW or DEPOSlTIONS §§ 11, 12 (1880).
4. Re Kingsley, 185 Fed. 1005 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911) ; see Calliand v. Vaughan,
1 Bos. & P. 210 (C. P. 1798); Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48 (C. C.
A. 6th 1905). See note 26 infra.
5. See notes 84 and 85 infra.
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consequently, there is considerable uniformity in their basic features. For
example, adequate notice to the opponent of the time and place of the
interrogation is universally required 6 to insure the privilege of cross-
examination under the Hearsay Rule.
7  Also in compliance with this
Rule, the statutes permit resort to depositions only when the petitioner
establishes the specified grounds of unavailability of the witness at the
trial.8
There are several types of depositions which are employed by Amer-
ican courts and they should be distinguished, as the respective require-
ments and procedure for their taking and use vary.
The most common are the de bene esse depositions, so-called because
they are taken "in anticipation of future need." Formerly these could
be taken only on the existence of certain grounds of apprehension con-
cerning the witness' unavailability at the trial, such as absence from the
jurisdiction, or illness.9 Modern statutes, however, generally permit them
to be taken merely upon notice to the opponent. Such depositions are
called "depositions on notice" to distinguish them from the older type
though they are de bene esse in that they, like the older type, can be used
at the trial only when prescribed contingencies prevent the witness' attend-
ance.
10
Depositions on commission are distinguished from those de bene esse
in that they may be taken only on application to, and before an officer
appointed by, the issuing court, whereas de bene esse depositions are taken
as of right, before officials designated by statute." Further, when the
application for the commission has been granted, the deposition may be
used at the trial regardless of the availability of the witness.'
2 However,
although the requirements of issuance are infrequently specified by statute
but rather are left to the discretion of the court, the same general con-
tingencies which condition the use of a de bene esse usually determine the
6. For example, FED. R. Civ. P., 30: "A party desiring to take the deposition of
any person on oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other
party to the action." See also N. Y. C. P. A. § 290 (Thompson, 1939) ; PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 28, § 9 (Purdon, 1930) ; V WIGmoRE, EViDENcE §§ 1377, 1378 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2 (U. S. 1859) ; V WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note
6, § 1377.
8. Some statutes require these grounds as a condition of the taking. See, e. g.,
R. S. § 863 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 639 (1934). But the trend is to allow depositions to
be taken without leave of court on notice to the opposing party, requiring, however,
that prescribed grounds be shown before the deposition is used in evidence. See, e. g.,
FED. R. Civ. P., 26(d).
9. Vagaszki v. Consolidation Coal Co., 225 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 2d 1915) ; Read v.
Bertrand, 20 Fed. Cas. 349, No. 11,603 (C. C. D. Pa. 1825).
10. Comparison of R. S. § 863, 28 U. S. C. § 639 (1934), the largely *superseded
de bene esse statute, with the current FED. R. Civ. P., 26(a) illustrates the evolution.
The former states that a deposition may be taken "when the witness lives at a greater
distance from the trial than one hundred miles, or is bound on a voyage to sea, or is
about to go out of the United States. . . ." The latter requires as a condition of
taking only that answer has been filed and Rule 30(a) requires "reasonable notice" as
the only additional requirement. For a detailed discussion of the de bene esse statutes,
see DYER-SMITM, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL §§ 719-863 (1939).
11. Spellman v. Sullivian, 61 F. 2d 787 (C. C. A. 2d 1932) ; Henning v. Boyle, 112
Fed. 397 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901).
12. Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S. 522 (1886). This seems inconsistent
with Rules of Evidence, but note that a dedimnus cannot be used where a de bene esse
deposition is available. Heister v. Lehigh & N. E. R. Co., 50 F. 2d 928 (S. D. N. Y.
1931). The issuance of a dedimus would, therefore, be permitted only in unusual
cases where considerations other than availability of the witness per se are involved.
See note 13 infra.
issuance of a commission. 13 Deposition by commission was the only means,
apart from letters rogatory, by which evidence could be secured from wit-
nesses abroad before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the federal courts, for it was held that officials before whom de bene esse
depositions could be taken did not include foreign officials. 14 The pre-
Rules federal statutes use the term dedimus potestatem in regard to a
deposition by commission to distinguish it from a deposition de bene esse;
that term, therefore, will be used in the discussion of depositions by com-
mission under those statutes.
The deposition in perpetuam rei inemoriam was Chancery's happy
solution to the unhappy predicament of the petitioner whose witnesses
might die or emigrate before his right of action at law accrued.15 It will
not issue when a de bene esse is available' 6 and remains a rarely-used
equity device as solicitously preserved by the Rules 17 as by prior federal
statutes 18 and by many states. 19 It is taken on commission and has at
times been used to secure evidence in foreign countries.
20
Since the foregoing methods frequently proved ineffectual to secure
needed evidence abroad, the courts early resorted to the self-help device
of letter rogatory, which is a request to a foreign tribunal to summon the
desired witness before it and to propound questions included in the com-
munication by the remitting court. The use of this unique procedure,
transplanted from the civil to the common law by the admiralty courts, is
said to rest on comity and to be an inherent power of the courts.
2 1
The preceding discussion indicates the basic techniques available to
our courts to "import" evidence; the succeeding discussion will describe
how these techniques have been enlarged by statute and tested by usage.
Their deficiencies thus demonstrated, together with attempted and sug-
gested remedies, will be reviewed. From that survey conclusions will be
drawn regarding steps necessary to expedite the procurement of evidence
abroad.
13. This is necessarily so if the Hearsay Rule is to be observed. See note 8 supra.
Thus in United States v. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1883) and Zych v.
American Car & Foundry Co., 127 Fed. 723 (C. C. D. Mo. 1904) a dedimus was issued
on the grounds, respectively, of distance from the place of trial of the witness together
with the petitioner's financial inability to pay his transportation, and the absence of
the witness from the jurisdiction. It would seem, therefore, that the difference be-
tween the grounds required for these two types of depositions lies in the greater dis-
cretion of the court in issuing a dedilmus. Compare R. S. § 863 (1875), 28 U. S. C.
§ 639 (1934) (de bene esse statute) with R. S. § 866 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 644 (1934)
(dedimus statute). See Levinstein v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., 258 Fed. 662
(D. C. Del. 1919).
14. Bird v. Halsy, 87 Fed. 671 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1898) ; Cortes v. Tannhauser, 18
Fed. 667 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883).
15. Westinghouse Machine Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 170 Fed. 430 (C.
C. A. 3d 1909). See WEKS, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 11, 12.
16. Petersime Incubator Co. v, Bundy Incubator Co., 93 F. 2d 936 (C. C. A. 6th
1937).
17. "This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an action to per-
petuate testimony." FED. R. Civ. P., 27(c). Rule 27(a) and (b) expands and simpli-
fies the procedure to secure a deposition in perpetuam rei memoriam so that Rule
27(c) will probably be rarely resorted to.
18. "Any district court, upon application to it as a court of equity, may, according
to the usages of Chancery, direct depositions to be taken in perpetuam rei vnemoram.
." R. S. § 866 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 644 (1934).
19. For example, CALIF. CODE CIV. P. §§ 2083-2089 (Deering, 1941) ; N. Y. C. P.
A. § 295 (Thompson, 1939).
20. See Union Solvents Corp. v. Butacet Corp., 2 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1933).
21. Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Lochren, 143 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 8th 1906);
Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S. W. 74 (1920).
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While the practice under the Federal Rules is of primary concern in
the survey of federal depositions procedure, it is necessary to give some
attention to the pre-Rules depositions statutes both because the Rules
retain some of their features and because federal tribunals not subject to
the Rules still operate under these statutes.
22
PRE-RULES FOREIGN DEPOSITION PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 23 established the pattern of federal
deposition practice which, without major revision, survived until the
promulgation of the Rules. This statute, and subsequent reEnactments,
preserved the power of the equity courts to direct a deposition in perpetualn
rei inemoriam "according to the usages of Chancery" 24 and that of the
law courts to direct a dedimus potestatem "where it is necessary to pre-
vent a failure or delay of justice . . . according to common usage." 25
But by this grant to the law courts of Chancery's historical prerogative to
issue a dedimus and by their further authorization of depositions de bene
esse as of right, these statutes marked a significant departure from the
common law.2 6 It was early asserted, therefore, that they should be strictly
construed. 27 But this attitude seems inconsistent with the inherent nature
of depositions practice, which was inaugurated by equity to overcome the
infirmities of the law courts in the promotion of justice; accordingly, state
courts have sometimes evinced a more liberal viewpoint in the interpreta-
tion of comparable state statutes.2 8  On the other hand, the mandate of
the statute that "The mode of proof in the trial of actions at common law
shall be by oral testimony of witnesses in open court except as hereinafter
provided," 29 left the courts little latitude. The Supreme Court accord-
ingly held in Ex Parte Fiske 3 0 that unless the grounds urged in support
of a deposition were such as came within the purview of the de bene esse
or dedimus statutes, *such depositions were not validly issued.
Since these two exceptions only were made to the rule of oral testi-
mony in open court, the decision that the de bene esse statutes did not apply
to foreign depositions 31 made the dedimus statutes the only authority for
22. FED. R. Civ. P., 1, states that the Rules shall apply in the district courts of the
United States. So, courts such as the Supreme Court, the appellate courts and special
courts such as the Court of Claims are not covered by the Rules. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the coverage of the Rules, see DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL ExAmINATIONs BE-
FoRE TRIAL § 14 (1939).
23. 1 STAT. 88 (1848).
24. R. S. §866 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §644 (1934).
25. Ibid.
26. The Act of 1789 anticipated by forty-five years, 1 WILL. IV, c. 22, § 1 (1834),
which granted to the English law courts the power to direct depositions, although by
13 GEO. III, c. 63, § 44 (1773) the courts at Westminster were permitted to issue
depositions for the examination of witnesses in India. See WEEKs, LAW OF DEPosI-
TioN7 § 48 (1880).
27. "The authority to take testimony in this manner, being in derogation of the
common law, has always been construed strictly." Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351
(U. S. 1828) (Justice Story discussing de bene esse statutes). But see Cornet v.
Williams, 20 Wall. 226 (U. S. 1873).
28. See, e. g., Rawsthorn v. Rawsthorn, 198 Wash. 471, 478, 88 P. 2d 847, 850
(1939) ; Etter v. Early Foundry Co., 164 Misc. 88, 90, 298 N. Y. S. 208, 211 (1937).
29. R. S. §861 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §635 (1940).
30. 113 U. S. 713 (1885) ; cf. Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48 (C.
C. A. 6th 1905); National Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 1st
1899), cert. denied, 175 U. S. 724 (1899).
31. See note 14 supra. Contra: Bischoffscheim v. Baltzer, 10 Fed. 1 (C. C. S.
D. N. Y. 1882). The latter interpretation, however, found no favor in subsequent
cases.
the courts to order depositions abroad.32 This is true even though the Act
of March 9, 1892 3 makes lawful the taking of depositions in law pro-
ceedings in the district courts in the mode prescribed by the laws of the
forum state; for this Act, it has been held, does not expand the grounds
for taking depositions as specified in the de bene esse and dedimus statutes
but merely permits the adoption of state procedure once those grounds
are established.
34
It should be noted that the depositions practice of the equity courts
rested on a somewhat ill-defined basis. It is true that courts of equity
were empowered to direct in ntemoriam depositions according to the
"usages of Chancery," but since both the de bene esse and dedimus statutes
permitted them to use these latter devices in addition,35 the question arose
whether the "usages of Chancery" or the usages prescribed by these
statutes should prevail when equity employed the latter deposition methods.
The cases indicate that "usages of Chancery" govern,36 although equity's
authority to employ these latter methods arises from these statutes.37 The
general requirements for in nemoriam depositions, already noted, were
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California; 3s the detailed
rules of procedure are governed by the Equity Rules 39 promulgated by
the Supreme Court under statutory authority to "prescribe the rules gov-
erning the mode of proof in causes in equity and admiralty." 40 This con-
fusing situation was alleviated somewhat by the fact that when a case
qualified for a de bene esse or dedimus at law, a court would not resort to
its equity prerogatives.4' Since the Rules spelled the end of the separate
jurisdiction of law and equity,42 except that the right to preserve testimony
is preserved, the difficulties of in memoriam depositions have largely
abated.
32. Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209 (U. S. 1839) ; Cortes v. Tannhauser, 18 Fed.
667 (C. C. S. D. N: Y. 1883).
33. 27 STAT. 7 (1893).
34. National Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502 (C. C. A. 1st 1899), cert.
denied, 175 U. S. 724 (1899) ; Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 306 (C. C. D. Kan.
1894).
35. R. S. § 863 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 639 (1934) provides that depositions de bene
esse may be taken ". . . in any civil cause . . ." while R. S. § 866 (1875), 28 U.
S. C. § 644 (1934) allows "... any of the courts of the United States . . ." to
grant a dedimus.
36. Westinghouse Machine Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 170 Fed. 430 (C.
C. A. 3d 1909) ; Edison Eelectric Co. v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 138 Fed.
460 (C. C. D. N. J. 1890) ; Bischoffscheim v. Baltzer, 10 Fed. 1 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1882).
37. Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. 183 (C. C. D. Vt. 1888). The courts have been very
careful to emphasize that, although the same section of the statute authorizes both the
issuance of a dedimus and an in inemoriam deposition, the requirements of issuance are
mutually independent. Westinghouse Machine Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co.,
supra, note 36.
38. 292 U. S. 341 (1934). To illustrate the relative rarity of this type of pro-
ceeding, it may be noted that this was the first bill to perpetuate testimony that had
ever been brought in the Supreme Court.
39. The Equity Rules of 1912 are set out in 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1928). Rule 47
authorizes the taking of depositions ". . . when allowed by statute, or for good and
exceptional cause. . . ." Rule 54 empowers the courts to permit depositions to be
taken in accordance with the de bene esse and dedinus statutes.
40. R. S. §862 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §637 (1940). Also see R. S. §917 (1875), 28
U. S. C. 730 (1940). The application of these statutes is illustrated in M. Whitmark
& Sons v. Calloway, 22 F. 2d 412 (E. D. Tenn. 1927).
41. Peters v. Prevost, 19 Fed. Cas. 366, No. 11,032 (C. C. D. N. Y. 1813).
42. "These Rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the United States
in suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity. . . .. FED.
R. CIv. P., 1.
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The life of these pre-Rules statutes was plagued by both a congenital
and an acquired infirmity. The congenital infirmity was the meaning of
"common usage" in the dedimus statutes, according to which standard a
commission might issue. The acquired infirmity was the problem of the
effect of several Acts of Congress which sought to introduce a degree of
standardization in American deposition procedure by permitting state laws,
in some cases, to govern the mode of procedure.
In the beginning, "common usage" was generally accepted to mean
according to the practice existing among the several states, for there was
no other usage.43  The adoption of section 866 of the Revised Statutes in
1874,44 though little more than a rewording of the original Act of 1789,
resulted in the new interpretation that "common usage" meant usage
current in 1874 in the state where the federal court was sitting.45 The
controversy was, however, at length resolved by two important decisions.
The first, United States v. Fifty Boxes of Lace, etc.,46 held that "common
usage" as used in the 1874 statute meant the accepted rules as they existed
in he federal courts in 1874. The second, The Titanic,4 7 concurred in the
opinion that federal court usage was the standard but broadened the
definition to refer to the usage that might evolve there with the changing
times. A Supreme Court decision 48 has endorsed the view that the
standard is federal court usage and the Titanic decision, therefore, although
a circuit court ruling, would seem to be the logical extension of that view.
The more detailed requirements for securing a dedimus, such as notice,
oath of witnesses, etc., were prescribed by the rules of the issuing court,
by special instructions accompanying the commission, and by a considerable
body of case law on the subject. The main features of depositions practice
under these statutes and the problems arising therefrom will be discussed
as they become relevant to the discussion of the Federal Rules. 49
Four Acts passed during the tenure of the dedimus statutes interjected
a measure of confusion into the cases. These were the Conformity Act,50
the Rules of Decision Act,51 the Competency of Witnesses Act,52 and the
Act of March 9, 1892."3 Their laudable purpose was to simplify procedure
by allowing or requiring local state practice to be followed in certain phases
of actions in the federal courts. Ironically, however, they served rather to
confuse the law regarding federal depositions practice; but despite the con-
fusion and litigation concerning the effect of these Acts, the courts gen-
erally did not find it difficult to assert the supremacy of the federal deposi-
43. Buddicum v. Kirk, 3 Cranch 292 (U. S. 1806) ; Warren v. Younger, 18 Fed.
859 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1884) ; Flint v. Crawford County, 9 Fed. Cas. 276, No. 4871
(C. C. D. Kan. 1879). Contra: Randall v. Venable, 17 Fed. 162 (C. C. W. D. Tex.
1883).
44. R. S. §866 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §644 (1934).
45. United States v. Cameron, 15 Fed. 794 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1883).
46. 92 Fed. 601 (S. D. N. Y. 1899). The court contended that the words of 27
STAT. 7 (1893) : "In addition to the mode of taking depositions . . . in the district
courts . . ." implicitly recognized a usage in the federal courts distinct from that in
the state courts.
47. 206 Fed. 500 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
48. Hanks Dental Ass'n. v. International Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303 (1904).
49. For a detailed analysis of depositions practice under the statutes, see DYER-
SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL §§ 719-974 (1939).
50. R. S. § 914 (1875).
51. R. S. §721 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §725 (1940).
52. R. S. 858 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §631 (1940).
53. 27 STAT. 7 (1893).
tions statutes by holding that these Acts did not enlarge the grounds for
taking depositions but merely permitted state procedure to be followed
so long as the grounds for taking existed under the federal statutes.5
4
The operation of the de bene esse and the dedimus statutes is not of
great relevance since the promulgation of the Rules. However, comparable
or contrasting fetures of the pre-Rules statutes will be noted in the dis-
cussion of the Rules for, as has been stated, these statutes still enjoy a
limited jurisdiction.m
FOREIGN DEPOSITIONS PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
The Rules characteristically seek to simplify foreign depositions prac-
tice by providing that they shall be taken "on notice" before specified
consular or diplomatic officials or by commission or letters rogatory, but
that the latter two methods may be used only when "necessary and con-
venient." rl Depositions on notice as provided for in the Rules correspond
generally to the statutory de bene esse depositions, in that both may be
taken as of right on due notice to the opposing party and may be used
only in the absence of the deponent because of specified contingencies, viz.,
death, absence from the country, infirmity or sickness. There are how-
ever, several significant distinctions: First, de bene esse depositions could
be neither taken 57 nor used 58 in the absence of the prescribed contingencies,
whereas depositions on notice may be taken without any conditions except
notice to the adversary, although certain grounds must be shown to permit
their use.5 9 Second, de bene esse depositions could not be employed in
foreign countries 60 while, as noted, deposition on notice is the primary
method provided for by the Rules in such cases. 61 Since Rule 26 (a)
provides that "depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these
rules," and no mention is made in the Rules of any other method of
taking depositions (except by commission or letters rogatory in foreign
countries),62 it is clear that the only way depositions may be taken
54. Hanks Dental Ass'n. v. International Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303 (1904) ;
Ex parte Fiske, 113 U. S. 713 (1884) ; Randall v. Venable, 17 Fed. 162 (C. C. D. Tex.
1883). For a thorough analysis of this federal-state conflict in the courts, see Sweeney,
Federal or State Rules of Evidence in State Courts, 27 ILL. L. REv. 394 (1932).
55. For a detailed survey of federal depositions practice before the Rules, see
DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL §§ 685-974 (1939).
56. FED. R. Civ. P., 28(b). This provision also reflects the general disfavor of
commissions in the courts of the United States. It was consistently held under the
statutes that a dedinus would not be granted when there were grounds for a de bene
esse. Henning v. Boyle, 112 Fed. 397 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901).
57. Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 306 (C. C. D. Kan. 1894). This is unaffected
by 27 STAT. 7 (1893), which gave parties the option of taking depositions according to
the methods permitted by the laws of the forum state. Hanks Dental Ass'n. v. Inter-
national Tooth Crown Co., 194 U. S. 303 (1904). But if the grounds for the taking
exist, the right to do so may not be denied. Re National Equipment Co., 195 Fed. 488
(C. C. A. 2d 1912), cert. denied, 225 U. S. 701 (1912).
58. Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Southgate, 5 Pet. 604 (U. S. 1831).
59. "There is no restriction whatever on the right to take . . . but there are
very definite restrictions on the right to use depositions." Sunderland, Discovery Be-
fore Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REv. 737, 741 (1939).
60. See note 14 supra.
61. Another distinction is that the courts, under the Rules, are not restricted to the
grounds listed but may allow a deposition to be used "upon application and notice that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interests of justice
. . . to allow the deposition to be used." FED. R. Civ. P., 26(d) (3) 5.
62. Unless the parties take advantage of Rule 29, which permits depositions to be
taken in any manner the parties may agree upon. There is doubt whether depositions
may be used in pursuance of this Rule where none of the prescribed grounds exist. The
1947] NOTES
248 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96
within the United States under the Rules is by deposition on notice.
This attempt to provide the same method for foreign as for domestic
depositions, plus the fact that depositions on notice is the method in
general use in the state courts,63 demonstrates a valiant attempt to in-
troduce order into American depositions practice. But this can be
only partly successful, for unless the deponent appears voluntarily
depositions on notice cannot be used abroad, because a subpoena, which
may be employed within the United States, 4 is ineffective in a foreign
country to compel the attendance even of an American citizen residing
there.65 The same is true in regard to the execution of commissions
abroad.
This barrier of national sovereignty to the effective use of a subpoena
relegates the deposition by commission to a minor role from its pre-Rules
dominance in the foreign field. 66  Even under the statutes it would not
be issued when grounds existed for a de bene esse deposition 67 except in
unusual cases (except the foreign field) which peculiarly qualified as
"necessary in order to prevent a failure or delay of justice." 68 Under the
Rules, commissions may issue only for foreign depositions and then only
when "necessary and convenient" and under such terms as are "just and
appropriate." 69 Only two cases of such necessity and convenience suggest
themselves: (1) to secure evidence in the British Commonwealth, where
the courts will intervene to compel attendance under a commission but
probably not under a deposition on notice,70 and (2) to secure evidence
in a place where the prescribed "secretary of embassy or legation, consul
cases under the de bene esse statutes were conflicting on the effect of the waiver of
grounds by the opponent. For an opinion that the parties, by consent, cannot use a
deposition when no statutory grounds exist, see Vagaszld v. Consolidation Coal Co.,
225 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 2d 1915) ; but cf. The Colusa, 248 Fed. 21 (C. C. A. 9th 1918).
Recent interpretation of comparable state statutes favors the unquestioned admission
of depositions in such cases. Re Kettles, 365 Ill. 168, 6 N. E. 2d 146 (1937) ; Mullins
v. Patrick, 229 Ky. 195, 16 S. W. 2d 1018 (1929).
63. See, e. 9., CALIF. CODE CIV. P. § 2031 (Deering, 1941); IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 2-1502 (Burns, 1946).
64. Rule 26(a) authorizes the use of a subpcena to compel the witness' attend-
ance according to the provisions of Rule 43, which requires only proof of notice as a
condition of its issuance.
65. But under 44 STAT. 835, 836 (1927), 28 U. S. C. §§ 711, 714 (1940) an Aneri-
can citizen abroad may be cited for contempt and a fine levied for his failure to re-
spond to a subpoena duly served in the execution of letters rogatory. Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932). Ordering an American in a foreign country to
appear is criticized in VIII WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2195c, n. 2 (3d ed. 1940) as a
breach of international courtesy. This is certainly true of a wanted deponent who is
not a national of the seeking court's country. See CommuNICATION OF JUDICIAL AND
ExTRA-JUDICIAL AcTs IN PENAL MATTERS AND LETTERS ROGATORY IN PENAL MAT-
TERs (League of Nations Doc. A. 15) (1928) V.
66. Professor Sunderland, a member of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure, states that the intent was to eliminate the formality and
expense of a commission whenever possible. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Un-
der the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 746 (1939).
67. Heister v. Lehigh & N. E. R. Co., 50 F. 2d 928 (S, D. N. Y. 1931) ; Henning
v. Boyle, 112 Fed. 397 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901); Turner v. Shackman, 27 Fed. 183
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1886).
68. R. S. § 866 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 644 (1934). In United States v. Cameron,
15 Fed. 794 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1883), for example, deponent's distance from the trial
and the petitioner's poverty constituted "necessity." Cf. Levinstein v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours Co., 258 Fed. 662 (D. Del. 1919).
69. FED. R. CIv. P., 28 (b).
70. This is by virtue of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act, 19 & 20 VIcT., c. 113
(1856).
general, consul, vice consul or consular agent" are not available, thus
precluding the use of a deposition on notice. Assuming that such a case
is made out, however, it is submitted that the Rules present a difficult
problem of construction to the courts by providing that the terms and
directions of the commission be such as are "just and appropriate." Shall
they use the standard of "common usage" prescribed by the pre-Rules
statutes? Or are they thus empowered to develop a body of law inde-
pendent of both the detailed requirements of a deposition on notice under
the Rules 71 and the considerable amount of case law under the dedinus
statutes? For example, may the court require the petitioner to show con-
tinuing grounds as a prerequisite to the use of a deposition by commission
at the trial even though this was not required under the statutes? 72 May
the court use its own discretion in determining whether to issue written
interrogatories? 73 It would seem that the courts must necessarily resort
to "common usage" in solving these problems or a degree of confusion and
divergence of procedure will develop, contrary to the spirit of the Rules.
Since the inability to compel the attendance of witnesses will frequently
render useless both a deposition on notice and a commission, letters rogatory
constitute the final resort. This development of medieval civil law,
74
involving direct negotiations between the courts of different nations with
delay and misunderstanding inevitably resulting from the disparity of lan-
guage and legal theory, is ill-adapted in its present form to modern re-
quirements. Besides, under letters rogatory, the court in which the evi-
dence is to be used has no control over the procedure to be used by the
executing court in summoning and examining the desired witnesses and
our judicial system properly frowns on this "abdication of jurisdiction."
On the other hand, where a commission or deposition on notice is used
the issuing court prescribes the procedure to be followed in its execution.75
For these reasons, although letters rogatory have been extensively used in
America, our courts usually require a showing that the desired evidence
cannot otherwise be secured.76 This showing is made on the motion for
the issuance, which may not be made until issue is joined 77 and may be
disputed by a counter-showing by the opposing party, although it is not
clear what showing must be made to defeat the motion.
78
71. Rules 30, 31 and 33 set forth extensive requirements in regard to both oral
and written interrogations such as the time for objections to questions, oath of the
witness, etc.
72. Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S. 522 (1886) ; Sergeant's Lessee v. Biddle,
4 Wheat. 508 (U. S. 1819).
73. "Common usage" required the use of written interrogatories. The Sun, 271
Fed. 953 (E. D. Pa. 1921); but cf. Compania Azucarera Cubana v. Ingraham, Max-
well & Beals, 180 Fed. 516 (C. C. D. Conn. 1910).
74. See 2 WHARTON, CONFLicT OF LAWs §§ 722-731 (3d ed., Parmele, 1905) ; 1
GREENLEAF, EVImEzciE § 320 (16th ed., Wigmore, 1899).
75. Kuehling v. Leberman, 9 Phila. 160 (Pa. 1873). It was also stated in this
case that the deposition will not be issued if the procedure is shown to have been un-
fair to one party. See also, Nelson v. United States, 17 Fed. Cas. 1340, No. 10,116
(C. C. D. Pa. 1816).
76. It was said in Gross v. Palmer, 105 Fed. 833 (C. C. W. D. Ill. 1900) that the
best way of showing this was first to try a commission. See Stengel v. Stengel, 85
N. J. Eq. 277, 96 Atl. 358 (1915). But generally such an extreme resort was not re-
quired. See DeVilleneuve v. Morning Journal, 206 Fed. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
77. Midwest Manufacturing Co. v. Staynew Filter Corp., 11 F. Supp. 705 (D. C.
N. Y. 1935).
78. In Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. Rainbow Light, Inc., 47 F. 2d 345 (E. D.
N. Y. 1931), which involved an application for a dedinus to secure evidence in Ger-
many, the court stated that merely showing that the deponent could come to the
United States would not defeat the application. Probably, therefore, an application
for letters rogatory would not be defeated by this objection.
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Since the issuance of letters rogatory has been held to be an inherent
privilege of the courts and their execution based on comity,
79 
-statutes have
only slightly invaded the field. The execution of letters rogatory issuing
from foreign courts to the federal courts is, however, somewhat restricted
by statute.80 The corresponding authority of the federal courts to issue
letters addressed to foreign tribunals appears likewise limited by statute 81
but this statute has been held merely to prescribe the procedure to be
followed in the case of letters rogatory issued in connection with a suit
in which the United States is a party or has an interest.8 2  Another
statute 83 empowers the federal courts to transmit subpoenas through
American consuls to recalcitrant American citizens whose depositions are
sought abroad under letters rogatory, and to fine such witnesses for con-
tempt of court if such subpoena is ignored. None of these statutes appears
to conflict with the Rules and they are, therefore, presumably still in force.
Rule 37 (e) specifically incorporates the subpoena-issuing statute into the
Rules.
FOREIGN DEPOSITIONS PRACTICE IN STATE COURTS
Statutes establishing and regulating depositions practice have been
enacted in all of the states.8 4 They are similar to one another and com-
parable to the federal statutes discussed, in that they specify the con-
tingencies which condition the taking and use of depositions and denominate
the officials who may conduct the examination.85 In several states 86 the
taking of depositions is a matter of absolute right, as under the Rules, but
generally, although they may be taken merely on notice, certain specified
grounds must exist.
87
79. See note 21 supra.
80. R. S. §4071 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 701 (1940). This act seems to permit the
district courts to execute letters rogatory from courts of a foreign country only when
the government of the issuing court is a party to, or interested in, the pending suit
and, in addition, the suit must be for the recovery of money. Jansson v. Belding-
Corticelli, 84 F. 2d 577 (C. C. A. 3d 1936) ; In re Letters Rogatory of the Republic
of Colombia, 4 F. Supp. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
81. R. S. § 875 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 653 (1940). This act establishes the pro-
cedure to be followed in a case where letters rogatory or a commission issue in con-
nection with a suit in which the United States is a party or has an interest.
82. DeVilleneuve v. Morning Journal, 206 Fed. 70 (S. D. N. Y. 1913). The
court here intimated that depositions coming from abroad would be executed in the
usual manner, but in the case of In re Letters Rogatory, note 80 .upra, the court seemed
more inclined to limit the execution of letters rogatory than the court in the DeVille-
neuve case did to limit their issuance.
83. 44 STAT. 835, 836 (1927), 28 U. S. C. §§ 711, 714 (1940). The constitution-
ality of this act was upheld in the famous case of Blackmer v. United States, 284
U. S. 421 (1932). See note 65 supra.
84. See, e. g., ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 51, §§ 24-27 (Smith-Hurd Supp., 1946) ; N. Y.
C. P. A. §§ 288-310 (Thompson, 1939); ANN. LAWS OF MASS., C. 233, §§ 24-64 (Mit-
chie, 1933) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, §§ 1-9 (Purdon, 1930). For a complete list of
state statutes on depositions practice, see Legis., 45 HARv. L. REv. 176, n. 3 (1932).
85. The anomaly does not exist generally in the state statutes as it does in the
federal statutes, of concurrent provisions for depositions de bene esse and commis-
sions, with an absolute right of use once granted. However, cases where a deposition
is "necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice" under the dedjmius statutes are
in many states anticipated by a catch-all provision allowing a deposition to be taken
"when there is a reasonable cause for apprehension that his testimony cannot be had
at the trial of the cause." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.854 (1938). Cf. IowA CODE, c. 622,
§ 622.01 (1946) ; N. Y. C. P. A. § 288 (Thompson, 1939).
86. E. g., REv. LAws OF N. H., c. 393(1) (1942); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§8-71
(1943).
87. N. Y. C. P. A. § 288 (Thompson, 1939) provides that the testimony of a party
may be taken when such person is "about to depart from the state, or is without the
To secure evidence from witnesses outside the state, recourse must
often be made to commissions or letters rogatory. Commissions to secure
evidence in other states are rendered -effective by mutual assistance laws
enacted in most states. One example is the Uniform Foreign Depositions
Act,88 enacted by eleven states, which provides that witnesses desired
under writs or commissions from courts of any other state or foreign
country "may be compelled to appear and testify in the same manner and
by the same procegs and proceeding as may be employed for the purpose
of taking testimony in proceedings pending in this state." Another ex-
ample is the statutory recognition of subpoena-issuing power in a "resident
commissioner" who is thereby enabled to enforce the commission sent
him.8 9 Before the passage of acts of this nature it was not uncommon for
the courts of one state to direct letters rogatory to courts of a sister
state. 0 As in the case of the federal courts, letters rogatory must still
issue when the desired witness is in a foreign country and will not appear
voluntarily before a commissioner. 91  The states, lacking treaty-making
power, must therefore await action by the federal government to facilitate
the process of securing evidence in foreign countries, as it has been facili-
tated among the states.
SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS
The foregoing indicates the legal devices provided for, but not the
mechanical steps involved in, the procurement of evidence abroad in both
the state and federal courts. The elements of deposition-taking, such as
oath of the witness and commissioner, objections to questions, means of
terminating the examination, signing of the deposition by the witness, etc.,
are too detailed in nature and divergent among the jurisdictions to be
practicably surveyed here. The same is true of the procedure for the
return of the deposition and its use at the trial.92 Reference to the appro-
priate statutes is, therefore, a necessary recourse in regard to these prob-
lems. Several general suggestions as to procedure may, however, be
made.
Consular officials are required by law to take depositions and to per-
form any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized
to do within the United States.9 3 Further, they are directed to take testi-
mony on notice or commission in conformity with the laws in the jurisdic-
tion in which the deposition is to be used and to comply with any special
instructions accompanying the request or commission.9" If the consular
state, or resides at a greater distance from the place of trial than one hundred miles,
or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds of belief that he will not be
able to attend the trial or other special circumstances render it proper that his deposi-
tion be taken." See also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.854 (1938).
88. 9 UNnioan LAWs ANN. 323 (1942).
89. N. J. R. S. § 2-100-35 (1937) ; N. Y. C. P. A. § 311 (Thompson, 1939) ; Wis.
STAT. § 326.24 (1943).
90. McKenzie's Case, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 227 (1843) ; Ex Parte Taylor, 110
Tex. 331, 220 S. W. 74 (1920). In the McKenzie case the court said it was especially
appropriate to execute letters coming from a sister state. Cf. Magdanz v. District
Court, 222 Iowa 456, 269 N. W. 498 (1938), where the court held that letters from a
sister state will not be executed when a commission might have issued from the former
state which the executing state would aid by enforcing attendance of the deponent.
91. Re Smith, 79 Misc. 77, 139 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1913).
92. Description of depositions procedure under the Rules is given in considerable
detail in DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL §§ 424-681 (1939). For
a general discussion of state practice, see Legis., 45 HARv. L. REv. 176 (1931).
93. 34 STAT. 101 (1907); 22 U. S. C. § 98 (1940).
94. 22 CODE FED. REGS. § 91.483.
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officer is not permitted by the local government where he is stationed to
take testimony he is required to return the papers to the sender with due
explanation for their non-execution and any suggestions he has for an
alternative method for securing the evidence.9 5 It is evident, therefore,
that whether state laws permit a foreign deposition to be taken on notice
or require a commission, these officials constitute the logical choice as
interrogating officers. It will be recalled that under the Rules foreign
depositions must be taken on notice before consular officers unless the
court considers it "necessary and convenient" to issue a commission, in
which case they would appear to be an equally logical choice provided
they are available in the locale of the witness. Letters rogatory, on the
other hand, must be directed to a foreign court and though this may be
by direct communication, non-familiarity by the issuing court with the
judicial system of the destination country usually makes it desirable to
route letters through the diplomatic channels via the State Department."
The Rules suggest that they be addressed to the "Appropriate Judicial
Authority in (here name the country)." 17 This devious routing, together
with the already-noted delay attendant upon dependence on foreign court
machinery indicates the desirability of avoiding the use of letters rogatory
where possible.
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS
Although the interdependence of nations in the matter of extra-
territorial depositions was long apparent, the first known international
agreement on the subject was not made until 1846 when France and Baden
signed a treaty on the mutual execution of letters rogatory.98 Following
that, numerous conventions of like nature were entered into, especially
among the European nations, until the advent of the Second World War.99
It is particularly interesting to note that our common law system can
successfully co6rdinate with civil law countries in the matter of judicial
assistance, as is evidenced by the network of such treaties entered into
between England and the European nations. 00
While these bipartite treaties were being effected between various
countries, international bodies were addressing themselves to the codifica-
tion of the rules of judicial assistance.101 One of the first general con-
95. Ibid.
96. Some foreign governments require the receipt of letters rogatory through the
diplomatic channels, although the United States does not. Requirements for letters
rogatory directed to Russian courts are laid down in the exchange of notes between
the ambassadors of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding letters rogatory
in 1935. See 167 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIES 304 (1936); 49 STAT. 3840
(1936). Practice to be followed by foreign courts in transmitting letters rogatory
to American courts is also indicated in this exchange.
97. FED. R. Civ. P., 28(b).
98. MONIER, DES ComISSIoNs ROGATOIRES EN DRorr INTERNATIONAL 20 (1909).
This treaty applied to letters rogatory in both civil and criminal matters and provided
for their transmission through the diplomatic channels, a procedure generally followed
today. See note 96 supra.
99. An extensive list of such agreements dating back to the beginning of the
LEAGUE OF NATIONs TREATY SEms may be found in 33 Am. 3. INTL. L. App. I
(Supp. 1939).
100. Between 1922 and 1937, England entered into twenty-two conventions on this
matter with most of the nations of Europe. See, e. g., Convention on Legal Proceed-
ings in Civil and Commercial Matters, 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS TREATY SERIEs 448
(1922) (England-France).
101. Considerable interest was shown in the matter over a period of years at the
annual \conferences of the Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of
Nations. See, e. g., REPORT OF SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 92 (1879); REPORT OF
ventions to be developed was the Convention on Procedural Law signed
by six South American countries at the Congress of Montevideo in 1889.102
The Second Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of 1905 103 was signed
by fifteen nations at the time and adhered to by an additional seven after
the First World War. The Bustamante Code of 1928104 was adopted
by fifteen of the countries of Central and South America. These conven-
tions were substantially similar in providing for the use of letters rogatory
as a means of judicial assistance and in promising mutual execution of
them.
The United States has subscribed to no international agreement on
judicial assistance. The reason usually given is that the federal govern-
ment cannot abridge the autonomy of the states in promising foreign nations
reciprocity in American courts. 05 This federal-state relationship would
not, however, have precluded the completion of bipartite agreements in
which our government could have promised reciprocity in the federal
courts but no such treaties have been entered into. The closest approach
to any agreement on the subject is the informal exchange of notes with
the Soviet Union in 1935 100 in regard to the transmission and execution
of letters rogatory, but this correspondence did little more than review the
American practice regarding letters rogatory and suggest the procedural
steps to be taken on the part of each nation for their most efficient ex-
ecution. In addition to this agreement, the United States has completed
numerous treaties since 1850 by which our consuls are permitted to take
the depositions of American nationals in the territory of the other signatory
power. 0 7 Consuls are authorized to perform this function by statute 108
but since they may not take the depositions of any but American nationals
unless such other persons are willing to appear, 0 9 it is apparent that these
treaties do little more than provide a convenient commissioner to take
evidence abroad." 0
A recent and notable attempt to remedy the defects of our present
foreign depositions practice is the Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance
TWELFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 114 (1886). See also, REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CONFERENCE OF THE INT'L. LAW Ass'N. 325 (1901) ; REPORT OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH
CONFERENCE OF THE INTL. LAW ASS'N. 234 (1908).
102. OBREGON AND BORCHARD, LATIN-AMERIcAN COMMERCIAL LAW 829 (1921).
103. 99 BITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERs 990 (1910).
104. SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 327 (1928).
105. Id. at 371; declaration by the United States that the Bustamante Code
could not be subscribed to by our nation because of our federal-state political set-up.
See also, Lorenzen, The Pan-Alnerican Code of Private International Law, 4 TU-
LANE L. REv. 498 (1930), in which it is pointed out that the Bustamante Code is
unacceptable to the United States for the additional reason that it embodies the conti-
nental system of the conflict of laws.
106. See note 96 supra.
107. These treaties have been completed with most European countries except
England and the Soviet Union. They may be found in volumes I-IV TREATIES, ETC.,
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS (1938).
108. 34 STAT. 101 (1907), 22 U. S. C. §98 (1940).
109. IV HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 845 (1942). Moreover,
only if letters rogatory have been issued is there any means of "persuading" Ameri-
can nationals abroad to testify in connection with a suit pending in the United States.
See not 65 supra. Cf. FED. R. Cw. P., 37.
110. However, a witness is more likely to be impelled to appear voluntarily before
a consular officer than before a private citizen. See DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINA-
TIONS BEFORE TRIAL § 590 (1939).
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drawn up by an eminent group of scholars under the auspices of the
Harvard Research in International Law."' This is generally comparable
to the conventions in force among the various nations in that it provides
for the mutual execution of letters rogatory. One innovation is its
alternative use of commissioners who, by the terms of the convention, may
resort to the court of the foreign nation to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses. This draft convention was drawn up, immediately prior to World
War II, as a guide to the State Department in establishing treaties on
judicial assistance but the intervention of the War has precluded any such
official ,action to date.
SUGGESTED REFORMS
The foregoing discussion indicates the two major shortcomings of
our foreign depositions practice. They are: (1) lack of information re-
garding the type of deposition which. the various countries permit to be
executed within their borders 112 and (2) the necessity of resort to the
cumbersome procedure of letters rogatory in the case of contumacious
witnesses abroad.
These difficulties are natural, perhaps inevitable, results of dealings
between nations of diverse customs and legal systems. They must be
overcome, therefore, as similar difficulties have been surmounted in other
fields such as sanitation and commerce-by general conventions on the
subject.1 3 The machinery of the United Nations is ideally suited for the
purpose of developing such a convention; as yet, however, that organization
has taken no steps in that direction." 4 An outstanding qualification to
this solution, however, is that such a convention could bind only the
federal courts to reciprocity. To forestall the result of delay in the enact-
ment of reciprocal legislation in all the states, it might be provided that
foreign courts resort exclusively to the federal courts in seeking depositions
in the United States. The most serious defect of such a convention,
however, is that such diverse legal systems exist 'among the nations of
the world that any agreement likely to be acceptable to all would perhaps
need to be drawn in such general language as to vitiate its effectiveness.
What appears to be a more practicable solution is the conclusion of such
a convention by the United States, the members of the British Common-
wealth of Nations and the civil law countries of western Europe and
South America. The Harvard Draft Convention referred to was pre-
pared with a careful eye to the reconciliation of the civil and common
law systems in this regard and would, therefore, well serve as a basis for
discussion. In reference to this Convention, it is suggested that the
alternative commission method be eliminated in favor of letters rogatory
as the sole means (and consequently, uniform means) of international
judicial assistance. Though letters rogatory have proved cumbersome in
the past, it is submitted that reciprocal agreements facilitating their trans-
mission and execution would make this the most acceptable expedient.
Although not so well known in American courts, they have, nonetheless,
111. The text of this draft convention together with an analysis section by sec-
tion in relation to conventions in force on the subject may be found in 33 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 35 (Supp. 1939).
112. For a survey of the types of depositions necessary in the major countries of
the world, see DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE T.IAL, Book III (1939).
113. See, e. g., U. S. TREATY SER. No. 948 (Dep't. State 1938) (International
radio communications regulation); U. S. TREATY Sm No. 992 (Dept State 1945)
(Health regulations for international air passengers).
114. Letter of July 28, 1947, from Mr. Oscar Schacter, Legal Counsellor to the
United Nations, to the writer.
been extensively employed here and their nature and use is well under-
stood in the civil law countries. The general criticism of this method,
that it leaves in the hands of another tribunal the control of the proceed-
ings, could be disposed of by the provision that any special instructions
accompanying the letter from the issuing court would be acceded to by
the recipient court so long as they do not concern a matter forbidden by
the laws of the country of the latter court." 5
Should the conclusion of a multipartite convention of this nature be
unattainable, bipartite agreements embodying procedure along the lines
suggested might be effected.
Whether international agreements such as the above-suggested are
entered into or not, some changes in our foreign depositions law are
called for. The federal courts are restricted in their execution of letters
rogatory to suits for the recovery of money in which a foreign country
is a party or has an interest.11 There seems to be no reasonable justifica-
tion for this restrictive legislation; indeed, it is a standing courtesy to the
other nations of the world which, so far as is known, make no such
qualification to the execution of letters rogatory issuing out of American
courts. Repeal of this statute, therefore, and amendment of the Rules
to provide for the unrestricted execution of letters rogatory, except where
doing so would be contrary to our common law principles, 1 would be a
significant step forward. In addition, the aforementioned statute per-
mitting the issuance of subpoenas to American nationals abroad who fail
to appear for interrogation under letters rogatory," 8 should be amended
to include similar default in the case of depositions on notice or on com-
mission. It is true that such procedure would be confined to actions in
the federal courts but even so it would obviate the issuance of letters
rogatory in many cases in that sphere and in addition would provide a
pattern for the amendment of the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act or for
state legislation to the same effect. Such legislation probably marks the
statutory high-water mark, as the barriers of state sovereignty, of course,
preclude any direct compulsion on the inhabitant of one nation by the
courts of another. This fact points up the ultimate purpose and necessity
for mutual treaties such as have been discussed. Finally, unanimous adop-
tion by the states of the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act 11 is desirable
in order to simplify the procedure for foreign nations in executing deposi-
tions within the United States.
Certainly foreign nations experience considerable delay and confusion
in executing depositions in America, both because of the federal court
restriction on the execution of letters rogatory referred to and because
of our unique federal-state judicial system. Consequently, revision of our
laws in the manner suggested should provide a stimulus for reciprocal
laws in foreign countries, if not a receptive attitude toward international
agreement on the subject.
J.E.L.
115. Such a provision has been embodied in most of the international conventions
in force or proposed on the subject. See, e. g., ACrEs DE LA DEuxikmE CoNFtCRaxc
DE LA HAYE, Protocole Final I, Art. 6 (1894).
116. R. S. § 4071 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 701 (1940).
117. For example, American courts have traditionally refused to execute letters
rogatory as a means of serving a summons issuing out of a foreign court. Re Letters
Rogatory of the First Civil Court of Mexico, 261 Fed. 652 (S. D. N. Y. 1919) ; cf.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877). For a discussion of this point, see 44 COL. L.
REv. 72 (1944).
118. See notes 63 and 85 supra.
119. 9 UNIFORm LAws ANN. 323 (1942).
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Compensation to Abutting Landowners for a Change of
Grade of a Highway
When a landowner whose property abuts on a highway is adversely
affected by a change in grade of the public highway, there is difficulty and
confusion in determining his right, if any, to recovery.1 The right to
damages in such a situation is based upon the eminent domain section of
the various state constitutions. These sections are of two types 
2 and under
each type courts have achieved a variety of results. Moreover, even if
recovery is permitted, the ascertainment of the quantum of damages has
been a knotty problem. In order to determine with clarity the likelihood
of recovery in a given case and to decide which of the many interpreta-
tions is the most desirable, it is necessary to examine in detail the two
types of state constitutional provisions and the reasoning behind the
decisions interpreting them, as well as to discover the correct measure of
damages.
RECOVERY UNDER CONSTITUTIONS LIMITING COMPENSATION TO.
PROPERTY TAKEN 
8
The dogma elicited by text writers 4 and cited by many courts 5 is
that there can be no recovery for damages to abutting property resulting
from a mere change of grade in the street in front of it, there being no
physical injury to the property itself,6 and the change being authorized
1. This problem is not a new one. In 1773, in Leader v. Moxon, 3 Wils. 461, 2
B. 924 (1773), recovery was permitted for a change of grade which intercepted the
light and prevented access to plaintiff's house. But this case was expressly overruled
by the language of Lord Kenyon in Governor and Company of the British Cast Plate
Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 D. & E. 794 (1792), which case has been relied upon
as authority for the American decisions denying recovery. See also 18 Am. Jun.,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 216 and cases cited therein.
2. See notes 3 and 36 infra.
3. The constitutions of each state, of which the following provision is typical, pro-
vide for compensation in at least this type of case. "Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." "Taking" is here used as meaning
"an actual physical appropriation of the land" as differentiated from mere interference
with certain easements and "property," i. e., right to use the land undisturbed by the
adjacent landowner. IowA CoNsT. Art. I, § 18; ME. CoNsT. Art. I, § 21; N. J. CoNsT.
Art. I, § 16; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 7; Nxv. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8; ORE. CONsT. Art. I,
§ 18; R. I. CoNsT. Art. I, § 16; S. C. CoNST. Art. I, § 17. The wording of the consti-
tutions in certain other states which also limit recovery to a "taking" of private prop-
erty for public use differ from the above in a few details, but the broad outline re-
mains the same. Compare CONN. CONST. Art. I, § 11; DEL. CONsT. Art. I, § 8; FLA.
CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 29; IDAHO Co~sT. Art. I, § 14; IND. CONST. Art. I, § 21 ; MD.
CoNsT. Art. III, § 40; MASS. CoxsT. Art. X, § 11; MicH. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 1; N.
H. Co NsT. Part I, Art. XII; N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17; TENN. CONST. Art. I, § 21;
VT. CONST. C. 1, Art. II; Wis. CONsT. Art. I, § 13. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V also has
a comparable provision.
4. 1 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN § 133 (3rd ed. 1909) and cases cited at n. 96 there-
in; 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 685 (3rd ed. 1881).
5. Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891) ; Pontiac v. Carter, 32
Mich. 164 (1875) ; Hickman v. Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225 (1894) ; Mc-
Cullough v. Campbellsport, 123 Wis. 324, 101 N. W. 709 (1904).
6. Detroit v. Grigg Hanna Lumber and Box Co., 296 Mich. 415, 296 N. W. 310
(1941) ; Calhoun v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 208 N. C. 424,
181 S. E. 271 (1935) ; Ail v. Portland, 136 Ore. 654, 299 Pac. 306 (1931).
by law.7 In the leading case enunciating this doctrine,8 the court reasoned
that the constitutional provision applied only to property actually taken
and appropriated 9 by the government, and not to consequential damages; 10
that when the highway was established, whether by condemnation or
otherwise, the public acquired not only the right to pass over the surface
in the condition it was in when first made a street, but also the right to
repair and alter the street in such manner as the public needs might from
time to time require; that the liability to damages by such alteration was
a proper subject for the inquiry of those who laid out the road,': or, if the
title was acquired by purchase, the proprietor might claim compensation
not only for land taken but for any such prospective damages; 12 and
that persons purchasing land, improved or unimproved, upon a street after
the lay-out, were to indemnify themselves against loss by reason of further
improvements or to take the chance of such improvements. 13
As far back as 1875 the theory that the original compensation for
land taken for public use includes the value of the land plus damages for
all conceivable future changes in the manner of using it and adapting it
to public necessities was criticized as obsolete.' 4 This theory has become
even less reliable with the passage of time, for it cannot accurately be said
that highway commissioners, in apportioning damages under condemnation
proceedings, could have forseen these future changes and adequately com-
pensated the landowners for them.' 5
7. Sheehy v. Kansas City Cable Ry., 94 Mo. 574, 7 S. W. 579 (1887); Alter-
ing Level of Highways, 57 JusT. P. 147 (1893) ; Note, 8 BKLYN. L. REv. 242 (1938).
This carries with it the corollary that unless liability is expressly imposed by legis-
lative authority, an abutting owner cannot recover any award, though damages result
from a change of grade. Hoffer v. Reading Co., 287 Pa. 120, 134 AtI. 415 (1926)
and cases cited therein at p. 124. The above, while within the spirit of the constitu-
tional provisions, .ipra note 3, basing recovery upon a taking of private property, was
enunciated by a Pennsylvania Court, under a constitution (infra, note 36) which would
seem to authorize recovery without specific legislation. But the court blandly stated
that the constitutional provision was inapplicable to the change of grade of public high-
ways, or to consequential injuries arising therefrom.
8. Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pickering 418 (Mass. 1823), in which the defendant,
acting as highway surveyor for Boston cut down the street in front of the plaintiff's
home so as to lay bare its walls and make possible its fall, to remedy which the plain-
tiff was obliged to incur large expenses.
9. See Baltimore & B. & 0. R. R. v. Bregenzer, 125 Md. 78, 93 Atl. 425 (1915).
10. In Garrett v. Lake Roland Elevated Ry., 79 Md. 277, 29 AUt. 830 (1894),
the court says that other states have changed their constitutions to include, as well as
"taking," "injured," "damaged," "appropriated," or "destroyed." Such a change is
necessary to render these consequential injuries compensable. This case, therefore, im-
plies that the addition of one of these four "magic words" is the key to recovery. But
is this actually so? An analysis of the cases indicates that such a rationale is an over-
simplification of the basic conflict between the private rights of individuals owning
land abutting on a public roadway and public necessity and convenience.
11. See Hyde v. Boston and Worcester St. Ry. Co. et al., 194 Mass. 80, 80 N. E.
517 (1907).
12. In Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pickering 418 (Mass. 1823), the court expressly
said, at p. 424: "When a man's soil is taken for a road, he is entitled to damages;
but if a new inquiry of damages is to be had every time a street is dug down, the
public might be obliged to pay several times over for the same land. This is a case
where the plaintiff has suffered damnum absque injuria."
13. "As their purchases are always voluntary, they may indemnify themselves in
the price of the lots which they. buy, or take the chance of future improvements as they
see fit." Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pickering 418 (Mass. 1823).
14. Compensation to Property-Holders for Changes of, Grade of Highways, 12
ALE. L. J. 53 (1875).
15. This same analysis applies as well to the case of a landowner who sells a por-
tion of his land to the government, be it municipal, county or state, for highway pur-
poses.
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It has been said 16 that the public, as proprietors of the street, stand
in the same relation to the abutting lot owners as would an individual
who owned the strip of land constituting the street, and their rights, duties
and liabilities are determined by the same rules as apply to adjoining
proprietors of land.17 In drawing this analogy the courts ask why, since
an individual may raise or lower his land without compensation to an
adjoining proprietor though it may injure the adjacent property, should
damages be required of the public for the exercise of the same right?
Some cases have, however, expressly denied this analogy,'
8 contending
that a highway or street having once been laid out beside a piece of
ground, the existence of the highway becomes thenceforth a part of the
value of the land. Its value to the property was estimated when the land
was taken in; 19 in many cases the actual benefit was assessed and paid
for.20 By lowering or raising the grade of the highway so that the lot by
its side is inaccessible except at the outlay of a large sum of money to
cause it to conform to the grade, the property owner is deprived of a
benefit for which he has paid, causing him an injury to which the raising
and lowering of a neighbor's lot provides no parallel.
21
Lowering the level of a highway may, and frequently does, interfere
with the right of the abutting owner to lateral support for his land. This
clearly is a "taking" for which compensation should be granted, and so
many cases have held.2 2  Some cases, however, shun this view, holding
such to be damnum absque injuria.23 It is in this type of case that courts
can properly apply the analogy of adjoining proprietors to an abutting
landowner and the public. 24 Adjoining proprietors have mutual rights of
support, and if the analogy is carried out it must be held that the adjacent
owner has a right to the support of his soil in that of the street. Govern-
16. Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pickering 418 (Mass. 1823).
17. The court here cited with approval the case of Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass.
220 (1815), which held that in the absence of malice one is not liable for any injurious
consequences which may result from his doing what he has a right to do on his own
land, without trespassing upon any law, custom, title or possession.
18. In Smith v. Corp. of Washington, 20 How. 135 (U. S. 1857) ; Radcliffe v.
Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195 (1850); Waddell v. Mayor of N. Y., 8 Barb. 95
(N. Y. 1850) and Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 1 Hump. 403 (Tenn. 1839), the law
applicable to adjoining.proprietors was made the basis of the rule laid down.
19. Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240, 253 (1876) ; Goodall v. Milwaukee et
al., 5 Wis. 32 (1856).
20. Adjoining landowners are sometimes assessed for at least a portion of the
cost of constructing a highway past their lands. The basis for this assessment lies in
the fact that adjacent landowners will be benefited by the erection of a highway; that
ingress to and egress from their lots will be more easily available to their convenience
and consequent increase of business, resulting in an increment in the value of their
property. This assessment is not limited to the cases where the road is built at the
request of the abutting lot owners, but includes even those cases where they did not
desire this to be done, but despite this, on the basis of "public convenience," the high-
way was constructed.
21. Fellowes v. New Haven, 44 Conn. 240 (1876) ; Skinner v. Hartford Bridge
Co., 29 Conn. 523 (1861) ; Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pickering 418 (Mass. 1823) ; Rounds
v. Mumford, 2 R. I. 154 (1852).
22. Delphi v. Evans, 36 Ind. 90, 10 Am. Rep. 12 (1871) ; Dahlman v. Milwaukee,
131 Wis. 427, 110 N. W. 479 (1907), modified and aff'd. 131 Wis. 427, 111 N. W. 675
(1907).
23. Crane v. Harrisd, 40 Idaho 229, 232 Pac. 578 (1925) is the most recent case
holding this. Although this was at one time the majority view, it has apparently
fallen into disuse in favor of granting compensation in this situation.
24. See notes 16 and 17 supra.
mental authorities have been held liable for the accumulation of surface
waters on the property of an adjoining landowner, on the theory that this
is a "taking" under the constitution.2 5  Here too it is wise to look to the
duties owed by each property owner to his neighbor. A city has no greater
power over its streets than does a private individual over his land.28 Cer-
tainly if an individual had owned the road in question and had done the
same work upon it with the same result, he would have been held'liable
for the damages here complained of.2 7  This is a direct and completely
unauthorized invasion of the property rights of an individual, for which
he is entitled to reimbursement.2
The many cases 29 which have been disposed of by a simple reference
to the authority of Callender v. Marsh 30 interpret a "taking of property"
as being "an actual physical appropriation of the land." Yet it has been
stated 31 that "property is composed of certain constituent elements, to
wit, the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal of that object."
It follows that when a person is deprived of any of those rights, he is to
that extent deprived of his property and hence his property may be taken
in the constitutional sense, although his possession remains undisturbed.
It would also seem to follow, then, as a logical extension of this interpreta-
tion of "taking," that whenever the lawful rights of an individual to pos-
session, use or enjoyment of his land are to any extent abridged or de-
stroyed by reason of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, his
property is, pro tanto, "taken," and he is entitled to compensation. 32  But
few courts so hold. In Selden v. Jacksonville 33 the court impliedly ad-
mitted the plausibility of such a definition, but refused to permit recovery.
34
In that case the court relied upon the "supremacy of public user" doctrine,
i. e., that these incidental rights (ingress, egress, light and air) are subject
to the right of the public to use and improve the street for highway pur-
25. Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392 (1866). In Lechner et al. v.
St. Louis, 121 S. W. 2d 242 (Mo. 1938) in addition to alleging that the municipality
so graded its streets as to cause mud and water to flow on plaintiff's property
in times of rain, forming puddles which became stagnant and diffused unwholesome
vapors on plaintiff's premises, plaintiff alleged that the walls of his house became
damp, that both plaintiff and his tenants were inconvenienced, that he had to reduce
rentals and had lost tenants. All of these factors were permitted to be considered in
determining the amount of damages.
26. In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P. 2d 878 (1934). See also notes 16 and 17
supra.
27. Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392 (1866).
28. This, of course, is inapplicable to states in which the dogma is that every
owner of land may improve his lot as he pleases, without liability on account of sur-
face water. In these minority jurisdictions, including D. C., Ind., Md., Mass., Mo.,
N. Y., Ore., and Wis., there is no liability on the part of a municipal corporation for
any interference with the flow of surface water whereby it is dammed back or turned
upon private property.
29. See cases cited in 1 LEwis, op. cit. mpra note 4.
30. See note 8 mpra.
31. St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 (1893) and cases cited therein.
See also Platt Bros. and Co. v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 Atl. 154 (1900) ; Selden
v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891) ; Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors, 74
Mich. 558, 42 N. W. 77 (1889) ; Pa. R. R. v. Angel, 41 N. J. Eq. 316, 7 Atl. 432
(1884).
32. In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P. 2d 878 (1934).
33. 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891).
34. "These incidental rights (the rights of ingress, egress, light and air) are, un-
der a constitutional provision which merely prevents a "taking" or "appropriation" of
private property, subordinate to the right of the state, etc., to alter a grade or other-
wise improve a street for street purposes.' Ibid.
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poses. Therefore, when such improvements are made, no private right
is affected and consequently no private right is "taken" and the public has
no legal right of complaint.35
RECOVERY UNDER CONSTITUTIONS GRANTING COMPENSATION FOR
PROPERTY "DAMAGED" OR "INJURED" 6
Under these provisions 37 one whose abutting property is injured by
the raising or lowering of the street in front of it is entitled to compensa-
tion, whether or not there is an actual "taking" of any part of it.
3 S
Although the constitutional modification 39 was intended to include all
damages or injuries resulting from the exercise of the right of eminent
domain which caused a depreciation in value of private property whether
this results directly to the property or is but an interference with the right
of the owner to the legal and proper use of his property,40 many courts
still think in terms of a "taking" of property, using the term "direct" (or
"actual") damages, as contrasted with "consequential" damages. If, how-
ever, adequate compensation for these injuries and interferences could have
been given under the former constitutional provision, there would have
been no necessity for the change, which therefore can only be construed
as broadening the basis for recovery and not as merely restating that
former provision which was in reality but a reiteration of the common law.
41
Where the act complained of is the original grading, whether (1) no
grade had previously been established or (2) (if previously established
and made of record) no steps towards leveling it in conformity thereto
had been taken, courts are apt to deny recovery for any injury sustained
35. Morris et al. v. Indianapolis et al., 177 Ind. 369, 94 N. E. 705 (1912). Con-
tra: Barrington Hills Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 11. 11, 191 N. E. 239 (1934),
which holds that these private rights cannot be taken by other than due process of
law. "In this regard," said the court, "conveniences are never balanced nor are equities
weighed."
36. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged [injured] for public use with-
out just compensation." ALA. CONST. Art. XII, § 235; ARiz. CONST. Art. II, § 17;
ARK. CONST. Art. II, §22; CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 14; COLO. CONST. Art. II, § 15; GA.
CONST. Art. I, § 2-301; ILL. CONST. Art. II, § 13; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 18;
Ky. CONST. § 242; LA. CONST. Art. I, § 2; MINN. CONST. Art. I, § 13; Mo. CONST.
Art. II, § 21; Miss. CONST. Art. III, § 17; MONT. CONsT. Art. III, § 14; NEB. CoNsT.
Art. I, § 21; N. M. CoNsT. Art. II, § 20; N. D. CoNsT. Art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST.
Art. II, § 24; PA. CONST. Art. XVI, § 8; S. D. CONST. Art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST.
Art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 22; VA. CONsT. Art. I, § 6; WASH. CoNsT. Art. I,
§ 16; W. VA. CONST. Art. III, § 9; WYo. CONST. Art. I, § 33.
37. The provision in some states refers to property "damaged", while in others
the reference is to property "injured." While these two words do not have identical
meanings in the law, nevertheless they are in this provision interpreted as being
synonymous. Brown v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 31 Pac. 313 (1892); Tidewater Ry.
v. Shartzer, 107 Va. 562, 59 S. E. 407 (1907). The reason for such an interpretation
seems to be that all the states adding one or the other of these words were following
the lead of Illinois which revised its constitution in 1870, adding "damaged" to its sec-
tion on eminent domain, and intended to remedy the same evil.
38. 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 4, § 348 and cases cited at n. 26 therein.
39. The modification referred to is the addition of the words "damaged" or "in-
jured" to the former, more restrictive requirement of compensation for property
"taken" in the eminent domain section of the state constitutions. For the states having
such a provision, see supra note 36.
40. Smith v. Miss. State Highway Commission, 183 Miss. 741, 184 So. 814 (1938);
State Highway Commission v. Smith, 146 Okla. 243, 293 Pac. 1002 (1930).
41. Even in the absence of any statute or constitutional provision, compensation
has generally been granted for private property which has been actually physically
appropriated to public use.
unless such establishment or change of grade is unreasonable or has been
negligently made.42
Compensation has been granted for damages to adjacent property from
the original establishment of a grade. In the leading case upon this point 
43
it was held that the fact that a building was constructed on a lot before
any grade of the street was established does not relieve the city from
liability or damages to the building resulting from the construction of a
sidewalk at a subsequently established grade.44  Such buildings when
erected are as much within the constitutional guarantee against damage
for public purposes as the ground upon which they stand.45
Compensation in the second category has sometimes been denied how-
ever on the theory that, "under the constitution a party may not recover
damages for every possible injury to his property that may be occasioned
by a public improvement . . . The landowner must be presumed to have
known what the established grade was when he purchased and must be
presumed to have known what the grade was when he erected his improve-
ments and to have built with reference to it." 46
Certainly it is true that land, improved or unimproved, may suffer
damages by a change in the level of the highway.47 The monetary damage
to the owner will be exactly the same whether this is the first establishment
of a grade or the newest change in a series of such alterations. It may be
said that he was negligent or imprudent in building upon land abutting
on an ungraded street. But if this is done in conformity with a "reason-
able grade" as determined by highway engineers he ought not to be placed
in any worse a position than if he relied on a grade which had been pre-
viously established, but which grade is subject to change at the instance
of the members of the appropriate governmental authority.
48
Compensation is sometimes denied where the change is from one
established grade to another subsequently established grade.49  One Penn-
sylvania case 5 concluded that for compensation to be allowed, there must
42. Leiper v. Denver, 36 Colo. 110, 85 Pac. 849 (1906) ; Durango v. Luttrell, 18
Colo. 123, 31 Pac. 853 (1892) ; Denver v. Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885).
43. Chapman v. Staunton, 246 Ill. 394, 92 N. E. 905 (1910).
44. Thus it will be seen that in this case the court allowed recovery on a much
broader basis (i. e., for the building) than was sought in many of the cases denying
recovery. Contra: Groff v. Phila., 150 Pa. 594, 29 Atl. 1048 (1892).
45. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consolidated Electric Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 37 Pac.
750 (1894) (owner of a lot on a street which was dedicated to the city recovered for
damages caused by grading the streets to the established grade) ; Moore v. Atlanta,
70 Ga. 611 (1883) (the grade had been fixed by the city but had not been recorded;
the court refused to enjoin the work, but held plaintiff entitled to damages) ; Davis v.
Missouri-Pacific Ry. Co., 119 Mo. 180, 24 S. W. 777 (1893) (plaintiff denied recovery
for consequential damages to his improvements by reason of the city changing the
grade previously established).
46. Denver v. Vernia, 8 Colo. 399, 8 Pac. 656 (1885), in which the plaintiff was
held entitled to recover for injuries sustained due to the unreasonable and careless
manner in which the grading was done.
47. And especially does this seem applicable to improved property, for once a
building has been placed on a lot, much money has been expended and the land becomes
more valuable. It may be used either as a dwelling place or as a place of business,
in both of which cases people will be inconvenienced to a greater extent than on a
vacant lot.
48. New Brighton v. Piersol, 107 Pa. 280 (1884).
49. Hoffer v. Reading Co., 287 Pa. 120, 134 Atl. 415 (1926) ; O'Connor v. Pitts-
burgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851). Contra: Roe v. County of Cook, 358 Ill. 568, 193 N. E.
472 (1934) ; Nevins v. Peoria, 41 Ill. 502, 89 Am. Dec. 392 (1866); Dickerman v.
Duluth, 88 Minn. 288, 92 N. W. 1119 (1903) ; Carson v. Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289
(1893).
50. State Highway Route No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 108 AtI. 820 (1919).
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be a change of lines and location, stating "[A highway] is not changed by
the elevation or depression of its surface any more than is the location of
a building changed by raising its roof." However, this simile has not been
reiterated by later cases.51
In those jurisdictions which permit recovery for injuries caused by
such alterations, a further difficulty is presented where a city street is
involved, the problem frequently arising over the erection of a viaduct 52
to carry traffic to a bridge, to another street or over a railroad crossing.
Some courts refuse to award damages in such cases on the theory that
one cannot erect a building on a city street and expect the level or grade
to remain the same despite the growth of the city which may make certain
changes essential.
53
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
It is generally said that the damage for which compensation will be
made is the injury to the property itself and not the mere infringement
of the owner's personal pleasure or enjoyment not affecting the property
in a special and peculiar manner. 54 The property must suffer some
diminution in substance or be rendered intrinsically less valuable. 55 The
abutting owner is entitled to recover the difference between the fair market
value of the property just before and just after the change.56 Decisions
involving the determination of the constituent elements of "present market
value" of property have held that the court may consider rental receipts, 57
and the removal of marketing business to a nearby street; 58 but may not
consider the loss of valuable shade trees growing on the public highway 59
nor the diversion of traffic.60 The mere fact that the property is worth
as much after the grading as before is not conclusive, since this may be
the result of a general increase in real estate valuations throughout the
vicinity, irrespective of this grading. Nor is its decrease in value for some
particular use necessarily a damage to the property. It is only when the
market value of the property is diminished by public use that the property
can be said to have sustained such damages as will entitle its owner to
receive compensation."' But the mere fact that the injury is common to
all the property in the vicinity will not bar recovery by one whose property
51. See Philpot v. Tompkinsville, 148 Ky. 511 (1912).
52. Pueblo v. Bradley, 23 Colo. App. 177 (1912).
53. Owensboro v. Hope, 128 Ky. 524, 108 S. W. 873 (1908).
54. Illinois-Iowa Power Co. v. Guest, 370 Ill. 160, 18 N. E. 2d 193 (1938); Wy-
man v. Boston, 282 Mass. 204, 184 N. E. 462 (1933) ; King v. Stark County, 67 N. D.
260, 271 N. W. 771 (1939) ; Spang and Co. v. Commissioner, 281 Pa. 414, 126 Ati. 781
(1924) ; 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 624 (3d ed. 1881).
55. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consolidated Electric Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 641, 37 Pac.
750 (1894).
56. Baucum v. Ark. Power and Light Co., 179 Ark. 154, 15 S. W. 2d 399 (1929);
Rockford Electric Co. v. Browman, 339 Ill. 212, 171 N. E. 189 (1930) ; Lebanon v.
Brents, 223 Ky. 377, 3 S. W. 2d 768 (1928) (a jury question) ; Louisville v. Kaye, 122
Ky. 599, 92 S. W. 554 (1906) ; Phila. Ball Club v. Phila., 2 Munic. Corp. Cas. 738
(1889).
57. Cuneo v. Chicago, 292 IIl. App. 235, 11 N. E. 2d 16 (1937).
58. Ibid.
59. Cassell v. Board of Councilmen of Nickolasville, 134 Ky. 103, 119 S. W. 788
(1909).
60. Chicago v. Jackson, 196 IIl. 496, 63 N. E. 1013 (1902).
61. Eachus v. Los Angeles Consolidated Electric Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 37 Pac.
750 (1894) ; Chicago and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Francis, 70 Ill. 238 (1873).
is specially damaged. 6 2  In ascertaining the amount or degree of the de-
preciation in market value the effect on the whole property should be
considered. If one part of the property is damaged and another part of
the same property is specially benefited, so that the value of the whole is
not decreased, then no damage is done for which compensation is recover-
able.
63
METHODS OF OBTAINING COMPENSATION
Under the constitutional provision that "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation" 64 there are four pos-
sible ways to recover.damages for injuries to abutting property resulting
from changes in the level of highways:
(1) Amendment of the applicable section of the constitution to
read "private property shall not be taken or damaged (or injured)
. . . without just compensation." But even this has not proved an
absolute guarantee of payment for consequential damages.
(2) A specific provision made a part of each highway construc-
tion act, authorizing compensation. This is always effectuated.
(3) Reliance upon the Ohio decisions 05 which have allowed re-
covery for the destruction or impairment of access 66 in three situa-
tions:
(a) Where the property owner builds to an established grade
which is subsequently changed to his damage.
(b) Where the property owner builds before a grade is
determined but anticipates the grade later established, and after
such reasonable grade is established it is changed to his damage.
(c) Wrhere the property owner builds before a grade is
determined and the grade which is later established is an unrea-
sonable one.
However, many courts refuse to follow these views.67
62. Powell v. Houston and T. C. R. R. Co., 104 Texas 219, 135 S. W. 1153 (1911),
reversing, Powell v. Houston and T. C. R. R. Co., 125 S. W. 330 (Tex. Civ. App.
1910); Texarkana and Ft. S. R. R. Co. v. Bulgier, 47 S. W. 1047 (Tex. Civ. App.
1898).
63. Shroeder v. Joliet, 189 Ill. 48, 59 N. E. 550 (1901), aff'g., Shroeder v. Joliet,
92 Ill. App. 68 (1901) ; Shawneetown v. Mason, 82 Ill. 337 (1876) ; Elgin v. Eaton,
80 Ill. 535 (1876) ; Louisville v. Kaye, 122 Ky. 599, 92 S. W. 554 (1906).
64. See note 3 supra.
65. Akron v. Huber, 78 Ohio St. 372, 85 N. E. 583 (1908) ; Akron v. Chamber-
lain Co., 34 Ohio St. 328, 32 Am. Rep. 367 (1878) ; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio
St. 133 (1876); Cincinnati v. Penny, 21 Ohio St. 499, 8 Am. Rep. 73 (1871);
Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 163, 168 (1865) ; Crawford v. Village of Delaware,
7 Ohio St. 459 (1857) ; Akron v. McComb, 18 Ohio 229, 51 Am. Dec. 453 (1849);
McComb v. Akron, 15 Ohio 474 (1846).
66. In cases involving interference with other easements, such as light, air, privacy
and lateral support, the Ohio courts return to the requirment of "actual" damages as
a basis for recovery.
67. 1 LEwIs, op. cit. supra note 4, § 135, "The uncertain, rambling and contradic-
tory condition of the Ohio cases . . . is evidence that they are not founded upon a
logical basis."
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(4) Reliance on the "constituent element" theory of "property,"
i. e., a liberal interpretation of "taking" to include the impairment
or destruction of certain "property rights" in the property itself.0 8 It is
submitted that this appears to be the most practical basis for recovery
under this type of eminent domain provision.
A constitutional requirement of compensation for property injured
should cover all damages resulting to abutting property by raising or
lowering the level of the adjacent street,69 but some few courts have denied
this construction. Here, of course, a statutory provision for compensation
will be enforced. However, specific legislation is often difficult to obtain,
and it would appear that a liberal interpretation of the words "damaged"
or "injured" should suffice to permit recovery.
While the mere regrading of the highway does not of itself give a
right to recovery, it is submitted that once some injury is shown to have
been caused thereby,70 the right to compensation should arise automatically,
whether or not there is an actual taking, physical invasion or destruction
of any part of the abutting land. Many courts have so held; this result
appears to be in keeping with the apparent intent evidenced by the inclusion
of one of the "magic words" in the newer constitutional provisions, 71 and
can (as has been done) be rationalized to permit compensation under the
older and stricter requirement that property must be "taken" in order for
recovery to lie.
F.M.P.
68. Scheibel v. Burr, 108 Misc. 551, 177 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1919) ; In re Seaside
and Brooklyn Bridge El. Ry. Co., 88 Hun (N. Y.) 143, 31 N. Y. Supp. 630 (1894) ;
Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166, 64 N. E. 141 (1902) ;
Blackwell, E. and S. W. Ry. Co., 18 Okla. 516, 90 Pac. 889 (1907).
69. 1 LEwis, op. cit. supra note 4, § 348 and cases cited at n. 26 therein.
70. This would include any one or more of the following: an invasion of plain-
tiff's right of privacy, an impairment of his easements of light, air and view, or an in-
terference with access to his abode or place of business with a resultant inconvenience
to him and those with whom he deals, or his customers.
71. See note 10 supra.
